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Abstract—Public blockchains such as Ethereum and Bitcoin
do not give enterprises the privacy they need for many of
their business processes. Consequently consortiums are exploring
private blockchains to keep their membership and transactions
private. Ethereum Private Sidechains is a private blockchain
technology which allows many blockchains to be operated in
parallel. Communication is needed between Ethereum Private
Sidechains to allow a function in a contract on one sidechain to
execute function calls which return values from, or update the
state of, another sidechain. We propose a crosschain technique
which allows transactions to be executed atomically across
sidechains, introduce a new mechanism for proving values across
sidechains, describe a transaction locking mechanism which
works in the context of blockchain to enable atomic transactions,
and a methodology for providing a global time-out across
sidechains. We outline the programming model to be used with
this technology and provide as an example, a variable amount
atomic swap contract for exchanging value between sidechains.
Although this paper presents Atomic Crosschain Transaction
technology in the context of Ethereum Private Sidechains, we
discuss how this technology can be readily applied to many
blockchain systems to provide cross-blockchain transactions.
Index Terms—blockchain, ethereum, crosschain, transactions,
private, sidechain
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we focus on Atomic Crosschain Transac-
tions for Ethereum Private Sidechains [1]. Atomic Crosschain
Transactions are motivated by two requirements common in
other distributed systems: data and functionality we wish to
use may be available in other systems. The first requirement,
accessing data in other systems, has been previously explored
by distributed query languages, for example SPARQL Feder-
ated Query 1.1 [2] and the Resource Description Framework
1.1 [3]. The second requirement, accessing functionality in
other systems, has been common for decades via Remote
Procedure Calls (RPC) [4].
Sidechains are blockchains which rely on a separate
blockchain for their overall utility, such as enhanced security
by pinning to the blockchain [5], for addressing information
[6], or for storing data which is used across all sidechains.
We use blockchains as a shared data store for all sidechains
participating in Atomic Crosschain Transactions.
Ethereum Private Sidechains [1] are ephemeral, on-demand,
private, permissioned sidechains which provide confidentiality.
Only the privacy and permissioning aspects of the technology
are relevant to this paper. Privacy relates to keeping the
identity of sidechain participants secret. Permissioning relates
to restricting which nodes can connect to a sidechain and
which Ethereum Accounts can be used with the sidechain.
Ethereum Transactions update the state of the distributed
ledger of an Ethereum blockchain but can not return a value.
Ethereum Views return values but can not update the state.
In this paper we describe Crosschain Transactions that allow
reading and writing across sidechains by combining Ethereum
Transactions and Views in the following way: A Crosschain
Transaction consists of an Originating Transaction and one or
more Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views, where
the Originating Transaction is the Ethereum Transaction which
executes on the sidechain on which the Crosschain Transaction
was submitted, and the Subordinate Transactions and Subor-
dinate Views are Ethereum Transactions and Ethereum Views
which execute on other sidechains as a result of the Originating
Transaction.
Reed [7] defines Atomic Actions as
...a program-specified computation that, although
composed of primitive computational steps executed
at different times and in different places, cannot be
decomposed from the point of view of computations
outside the atomic action. During the execution of
atomic actions, intermediate states of data objects
that arise will never be observed by computations
outside the atomic action.
In the context of Crosschain Transactions, atomic means that
the Originating Transaction and all Subordinate Transactions
are either all accepted or all ignored. Enquiries as to the state
of the distributed ledger on any sidechain after the Crosschain
Transaction has started and before it has ended will yield
a consistent value. Depending on the context of the read,
the value returned will be the value prior to the start of the
transaction, the value assuming the transaction is committed,
or the read will fail.
A key consideration which previous distributed systems
approaches did not need to overcome is consensus. Blockchain
systems require validator nodes to agree on the transactions to
be added to the blockchain using a consensus algorithm. Once
the blocks are added to the blockchain, the updates are final.
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Fig. 1. Crosschain Transaction
To deliver atomic behaviour across sidechains, we propose that
updates once added to blockchains be considered provisional.
The provisional updates need to be unrevocable. Once certain
conditions occur, the updates need to be either committed or
ignored.
An example Crosschain Transaction consisting of an Orig-
inating Transaction, a Subordinate View and a Subordinate
Transaction is shown in Figure 1. The application submits the
Originating Transaction to Sidechain 1 which causes the
function condBuy in the Control contract to execute. An
Ethereum View call is dispatched to the rate function in
the Oracle contract on Sidechain 2. The value returned
by the rate function is used in the condBuy function.
If the value is below 100, then an Ethereum Transaction
is dispatched to the Commodity contract on Sidechain
3. The buy function updates the state of the Commodity
contract.
A more complex example could have multiple levels of Sub-
ordinate Transactions being submitted to different sidechains
as a result of the Originating Transaction. Under the Orig-
inating Transaction and each Subordinate Transaction there
could be multiple levels of Subordinate Views, calling out
to different sidechains. The Subordinate Transactions and
Subordinate Views that are issued are dependant on the call
graph starting from the Originating Transaction.
We organised the paper as follows: in the Background sec-
tion we describe the concept of private blockchains and the en-
terprise version of Ethereum, explain the importance of having
finality for blocks so that they can be added to the blockchain,
describe some key research related to distributed systems
and two phase commits, and then explain threshold signature
schemes. The next section, Related Works, reviews alternative
existing techniques for crosschain transactions, showing that
they are not appropriate for atomic function calls across
blockchains, and reviews existing work on blockchain locking.
Thereafter, the proposed approach to Crosschain function calls
is described in detail in the Approach section, by first intro-
ducing the protocol components, then describing how Sub-
ordinate Views and Subordinate Transactions are processed,
and finally describing the overall Crosschain Transaction and
Crosschain View processing approaches. The Programming
Model to be used with the approach is described, including an
example demonstrating how to use the approach to provide an
atomic swap for partial amounts of Ether between sidechains.
How the approach and programming model could fail are
then analysed in two sections. Failure Cases Handled Within
Protocol explains how the protocol handles system failures
and attacks. Failure Cases Handled by Application describes
failure situations which should be prevented by the application.
The paper concludes with a discussion of how the approach
could be applied to other blockchain systems to provide atomic
cross-blockchain transactions.
This paper introduces what we believe is the first methodol-
ogy for processing atomic transactions which include function
calls across consortium sidechains. It describes how a thresh-
old signature scheme can be used for proving values agreed on
one sidechain to another sidechain. It introduces a method of
parameter passing between sidechains which links the function
doing the call in one sidechain to the function being called in
another sidechain. It describes an atomic transaction locking
mechanism which works in the context of blockchain. It
introduces the idea of using a coordination blockchain as a
global time-out, thus removing the requirement for crosschain
time-out synchronisation. It introduces a crosschain transac-
tion format and explains the methodology for processing the
transactions within an Ethereum Virtual Machine. This paper
contributes the concept of a Multichain Node. Multichain
Nodes contain a set of trusted sidechain nodes all of which
are on different sidechains, but work together. This paper
introduces the programming model to be used for Crosschain
Transactions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ethereum
Ethereum [8] is a blockchain platform which allows users
to upload and execute computer programs known as Smart
Contracts. Ethereum Smart Contracts can be written in a
variety of Turing complete languages, the most popular being
Solidity [9]. Code is compiled into a bytecode representation.
The bytecode can then be deployed using a contract creation
transaction. Contracts have a special constructor function
which only runs when the contract creation transaction is being
processed. This function is used to initialize memory and call
other contract code. Miners execute the bytecode inside the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). At present, each miner
must execute all transactions for all contracts and hold the
current value of all the memory associated with all of the
contracts. The Ethereum community is actively working on
methodologies to scale the Ethereum network by sharding the
blockchain [10].
Ethereum transactions update the state of the distributed
ledger but do not return values. They fall into three categories:
Ether transfer, contract creation, and calling a function on a
contract. Ether transfer transactions move Ether from the user’s
account to another account. Contract creation transactions put
code into the distributed ledger and call the constructor of the
contract code, setting the contract data’s initial state. Function
call transactions call a function on a contract and result in
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updated state. Contract creation and function call transactions
also allow Ether to be transferred. All types of transactions
must be signed by a private key corresponding to an account
and include a nonce value which prevents replay attacks. In
addition to Ethereum transactions, “View” function calls can
be executed on the Smart Contract code. These View function
calls return a value and do not update the state of the Smart
Contract.
Precompiled Contracts are code which is accessible to Smart
Contracts within the EVM at certain well-known contract
addresses. Precompiled Contracts are implemented as part of
the Ethereum Client in the Ethereum Client’s own language.
In the case of Pantheon Ethereum Client [11], they are written
in Java. Precompiled Contracts allow complex extensions to
be added to Ethereum which would either take very long to
execute or require resources outside of the EVM. As Precom-
piled Contracts are called from traditional Smart Contracts,
to allow all nodes of an Ethereum network to execute all
transactions, all of the nodes need to be instances of Ethereum
Client software which supports the same set of Precompiled
Contracts.
Executing code and accessing resources, such as memory,
costs certain amounts of “Gas”. The “Gas Cost” of executing
code is closely tied to the real world cost of executing each
type of instruction. The current “Gas Price” is set for each
block in terms of Ether by the miner who mines the block.
Accounts instigating transactions specify the gas price they are
prepared to pay for their transaction and specify the maximum
amount of gas a transaction can use known as “Start Gas”.
This commits an account holder to paying up to a certain
amount of Ether for the transaction. Any unused gas is returned
to the account holder at the end of the transaction. Miners
reject transactions which run out of gas prior to completing
execution.
In the Ethereum public network, “MainNet”, all contract
code and data are readable by any user of any node which
connects to the network. Smart Contracts on Ethereum Main-
Net can only perform permissioning in contract code, limiting
which accounts can update the state of a contract. However,
there is no mechanism to limit which users can read contract
code and data.
The value proposition of Ethereum is that it allows untrusted
parties to use Smart Contracts hosted on a public, distributed,
highly available, secure platform.
B. Private Blockchains and Enterprise Ethereum
Private blockchains are blockchain networks which are
established between nodes operated by enterprises [1]. Only
permissioned nodes belonging to participating enterprises are
allowed to join the private blockchain’s peer-to-peer network
and only permissioned accounts belonging to participating
enterprises are allowed to submit transactions to the nodes.
These blockchains provide the privacy and permissioning
required by enterprises [12].
The need for security and permissioning features over and
above what is available in standard Ethereum [12] has led to
a range of platforms being developed. J.P. Morgan developed
Quorum [13], a fork of the Golang Ethereum implementation
called Geth [14]. ConsenSys’s Protocol Engineering Group,
PegaSys created Pantheon [11], an Ethereum MainNet compat-
ible client which aims to meet the permissioning and privacy
requirements of the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification
[12]. Hyperledger Fabric [15] is a distributed ledger platform
originally created by IBM and now hosted by The Linux
Foundation. Similar to Quorum and Pantheon, the platform
offers privacy and permissioning features. Whereas Quorum
offers Ethereum based private transactions, Pantheon offers
private smart contracts which are private to a set of par-
ticipants. Hyperledger Fabric offers the ability to host one
or more smart contracts on a private blockchain called a
“channel”. Hyperledger Fabric allows multiple channels to
be operated on the one network, thus allowing for multiple
sets of private contracts between different sets of participants
to operate on the one network. An analysis of the merits of
Hyperledger Fabric and Quorum can be found in Requirements
for Ethereum Private Sidechains [1].
C. Finality
A block is deemed final when it can no longer be changed.
In some consensus algorithms, such as PoW, finality is prob-
abilistic, where as more blocks are added to the end of the
blockchain, older blocks are less likely to be reordered. Con-
sensus algorithms such as Istanbul Fault Byzantine Tolerant
(IBFT) [16] and Istanbul Fault Byzantine Tolerant version 2
(IBFT2) [17] give “instant” finality, where once a transaction
has been included in a block minted by a validator, it can no
longer be changed.
D. Distributed Systems and Databases
Gray [18] and Lampson and Sturgis [19] separately pro-
posed two phase commit schemes which allow decentralised
atomic updates. The first phase records a set of intentions
which indicate the data updates to be applied. The end of this
phase is to request the transaction be committed. The second
phase actually performs the update. If the second phase did
not complete then it is reapplied as many times as needed to
complete the algorithm.
Reed [7] proposed a methodology for processing atomic
actions on decentralized data when faced with system failures.
A feature of this methodology is that if a communications
failure causes the second phase of a two phase commit to not
reach a node, then when the node needs to access the data, it
contacts other nodes to determine if the second phase occurred
and the data should be committed or not.
E. Threshold Signature Schemes
Threshold cryptography schemes [20] split secrets into Se-
cret Shares. When a subset of participants cooperate they can
reassemble the secret by combining their shares. In particular,
any M shares of the N total shares can be used to recreate the
secret. An attacker who has access to fewer than M shares is
not able to determine any information about the secret.
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In the context of Threshold Signature Schemes the private
key is the secret which is split. Any M shares of the N total
shares need to be used to generate a signature. The M shares
can not be brought together to reassemble the private key,
as this would reveal the private key. Instead, the M private
key shares need to sign the data to be signed to generate M
signature shares. These M signature shares are combined to
create the threshold signature. The threshold signature can be
verified using the public key which matches the private key
which could be reassembled using the private key shares.
In a simple threshold signature scheme, the key shares are
generated by a trusted party, called the dealer, then distributed
to the participants. In a decentralised application, such a
trusted setup is undesirable. An aggregated threshold scheme
allows each participant to perform the operations of the dealer
and create a set of key shares. These shares are then aggregated
with the shares produced by the other participants to create
the final key shares. This allows signing and verification to be
done in a distributed fashion, without any trusted third party.
To ensure dealers are distributing correct values, the key
generation scheme should be verifiable. In such a scheme, the
final key shares are computed using an algorithm dependent
on the private key shares of each participant. The Pederson
commitment scheme [21] is an example of this form of
verifiable secret sharing. The use of a verifiable generator
proves that each participant is in possession of the private key
share corresponding to its public share and makes it impossible
for rogue participants to corrupt the process by submitting
invalid shares.
Aggregation of keys and signatures is only possible in
signature schemes with special mathematical properties. In
particular, signatures based on elliptic curve pairing such as
the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham scheme [22], support aggregation
due to the bilinear property of the pairing operation shown in
Equation 1.
e(k ∗ P,Q) = e(P, k ∗Q) (1)
This property allows signatures to be combined arithmeti-
cally, then verified by combining the corresponding public
keys in a similar fashion. In blockchain applications, this
allows all the signatures on all of the transactions in a block
to be combined into a single signature which can be verified
with the combined public key.
Another advantage of using a BLS-based signature scheme
is that it allows use of the alt-bn128 curve [23].This allows
threshold signatures to be verified in the EVM as the EVM
supports instructions to do this. The availability of EVM
support makes on-chain operations significantly more efficient.
III. RELATED WORKS
A. Overview
Karynamoorthy et al. [24] identified two core problems
crosschain transactions need to overcome: communications
between chains and the establishment of trust. Establishing
trust is a prerequisite to communications. Within an Ethereum
context, communication needs to encompass Ethereum Trans-
actions and Ethereum Views [8]. An Ethereum View executes
a function which returns a value but does not update the
blockchain state. This can be considered as reading data
between chains. An Ethereum Transaction executes function
calls which updates the blockchain state, can transfer value, but
is unable to return results. This can be considered as writing
between chains. Another type of communication, value trans-
fer, differs from general transactions which allow arbitrary
functions calls, and typically involve transferring Ether, the
underlying currency of Ethereum, or an ERC20 token [25]
[26].
The literature review below provides a summary of the
existing research into blockchain value transfer and function
calls. A more detailed review can be found in our “Sidechains
and Interoperability” paper [27].
B. Value Transfer
Hashed Timelock Contracts [28] have been put forward as a
mechanism for inter-chain value transfer. Smart Contracts are
created on two separate blockchains, for instance Ethereum
MainNet and a sidechain. A participant who wants Ether on
the sidechain in exchange for Ether on Ethereum MainNet
posts a message digest commitment to a secret to both con-
tracts and puts in escrow the Ether in the contract on Ethereum
MainNet. Another participant who wants to exchange Ether on
Ethereum MainNet for Ether on the sidechain similarly puts
Ether in escrow in the contract on the sidechain and posts
a message digest commitment to a secret to both contracts.
Both participants reveal their secrets and can then access their
Ether. This allows trustless transfer of Ether between Ethereum
MainNet and the sidechain. Given a fixed total quantity of
Ether on the sidechain, this would allow for Mass Conser-
vation between Ethereum MainNet and the sidechain, where
no additional Ether is created or destroyed. Building on the
concepts of Hashed Timelock Contracts, Thomas and Schwartz
have proposed an Interledger Protocol [29]. Additionally, the
Dogecoin to Ethereum bridge [30] uses this technology to
allow for transfer of coins between Doge blockchain and
Ethereum. A limitation of Hashed Timelock Contracts is
that the transfer can only be for the entire amount. There
is currently no way to offer to exchange only part of the
originally staked Ether.
Pegged Sidechains [31] proposes Bitcoins to be transferred
between the Bitcoin blockchain and sidechains, to allow for
increased transaction rate and experimentation. The solution
relies on publishing a proof that a transaction to transfer
Bitcoin was included in a block and that further blocks were
produced based on that block, in the source blockchain. If the
hashing power of the source blockchain is significant, then it
would be impossible for an attacker to produce forge blocks.
The solution requires a 24 hour confirmation period to ensure
enough blocks have been produced based on the block with
the transfer to provide adequate security. Wood [32] contends
that the sidechain hashing power is unlikely to be sufficient
to ensure security. Consequently, Bitcoins can be securely
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transferred to the sidechain from the Bitcoin blockchain,
but not back. Moreover, this proposal is not appropriate for
enterprise solutions, since confirmation times of 24 hours are
unworkable. Additionally, this solution is limited to value
transfer and does not provide a general purpose solution.
Minimum Viable Plasma [33] builds on the concept of
Plasma’s [34] delegate Ethereum blockchains. Plasma chain
operators create a Plasma Smart Contract on Ethereum Main-
Net and hold value deposited in the contract on a separate
Plasma chain as Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) [35]
values in a binary Merkle tree ordered by transaction index.
Transactions on the Plasma chain involve proving that an
unspent output had not previously been spent. Blocks on
the Plasma chain are pinned to Ethereum MainNet. Two
key challenges of this approach are the size of the proofs
and exiting the Plasma chain to recover funds on Ethereum
MainNet. The latter is particularly challenging, involving a
complex exit procedure which includes a seven day challenge
period.
Loom [36] have created a solution based on Plasma Cash
[37], which builds on the Minimum Viable Plasma approach
to allow for the exchange of non-fungible assets. Each token
has an identifier that represents the token’s location in a sparse
Merkle Tree. To spend a block, a proof needs to be submitted
showing when the token has been used. The main limitations
of this solution are that it is specific to non-fungible assets,
does not allow generic value transfer and cannot be extended
to offer crosschain function calls.
Crosschain communication in Metronome involves a two-
step approach: obtaining a proof of exit Merkle receipt when
removing tokens from the source chain and then presenting
this receipt to the target blockchain to claim the MET to-
kens [27], [38], [39]. Metronome’s design includes having
autonomous smart contracts with ownership functions locked
down after the launch [38]. Moreover, their cryptocurrency
token, MET, is touted to be the first that is not permanently tied
to any particular blockchain, and could be secured to another
blockchain [38]. Metronome is focused on the portability of
MET tokens between chains, and do not have any detail or
design for atomic crosschain function calls. Moreover the
validation phases of the movement of tokens are still under
development at the time of writing.
The Token Atomic Swap Technology (TAST) research
project proposes atomic crosschain asset transfers with the
requirement that these assets need to exist as tokens, such
as ERC20 tokens on the blockchains, independent of the
blockchain’s native currency [27]. It implements a claim-first
transaction as a manifestation of the proof of intent of the
sender to make a crosschain asset transfer. There are witness
rewards for attesting to the transaction and an algorithm is
provided for a cryptographically verifiable proof of intent
[40]–[42]. In order to implement this crosschain proposal all
wallet balances have to be on all participating blockchains, and
transferable assets need to exist as tokens on the blockchains
[27]. The need to have wallet balances on all chains may limit
the appeal of this approach, and performing atomic crosschain
function calls, especially if they are more than one level
deep, are likely to add a level of complexity that would be
challenging to implement.
C. Function Calls
Cosmos [43] proposes a multi-blockchain system in which
there are blockchains called Zones exchange tokens via a
central blockchain called a Hub. The Zones and the Hub use
Tendermint [44] a type of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
[45] [46] algorithm, rather than the Nakamoto Consensus [47]
used by Bitcoin. The value transfer uses a similar approach
to Pegged Sidechains, posting proofs that a transaction has
been included in a block. Similar to the Pegged Sidechains
proposal, the solution relies on the security of the Zones (in
the Pegged Sidechains case, the sidechains).
Polkadot [32] proposes a multi-blockchain network built
on Substrate consisting of Relay Chains, Parachains and
Bridges. Relay Chains, as the name suggests, relay messages
between Parachains. Parachains receive and process transac-
tions. Consensus for the entire system is provided by the
Relay Chain. There are two main roles that participants play
in the Polkadot ecosystem: Collator and Validator. Collators
collect transactions on Parachains, propose blocks and provide
zero knowledge non-interactive proofs proving the transactions
result in valid state changes to the Validators. Groups of
Validators ratify Parachain blocks and publish them to the
Parachain. The Validators seal the Parachain block headers
to the Relay Chain. The Validators are randomly assigned to
Parachains, with the assignment changing regularly. Validators
use a Proof of Stake consensus algorithm. Supportive roles are
performed by Nominators and Fishermen. Nominators provide
funds to Validators they trust to execute the Proof of Stake
consensus. Fishermen observe the Parachains and submit fraud
proofs to Validators.
Two forms of crosschain transactions exist in Polkadot:
Cross-Parachain and Polkadot to and from external chains
such as Ethereum [32]. With Cross-Parachain transactions, the
transactions are identical to typical transaction from exter-
nal accounts. The transactions are moved from the outward
bound queue on one Parachain to the incoming queue on
another Parachain. Transactions from Polkadot to Ethereum
are achieved by submitting transactions to a special multi-
signature Ethereum contract. Transactions from Ethereum to
Polkadot are achieved by calling into a special Ethereum
contract which writes an event to the Ethereum event log. This
event is interpreted as the outward bound call. The Polkadot
system is complex because of its underlying requirement to
allow heterogeneous blockchains. Routing Cross-Parachains
transactions via the Relay Chain is likely to result in a
bottleneck limiting performance. All Parachains connected to
a Relay Chain will use its consensus mechanism. If a different
consensus mechanism is required, then Polkadot proposes to
achieve this via a bridge between a ‘Main’ and a ‘Side’ chain,
but this functionality is still under development.
Wang et. al. [48] proposed a blockchain router sys-
tem for connecting heterogeneous blockchains via a routing
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blockchain, in a similar way to Polkadot and Cosmos. Multiple
Connector components monitor each sub-chain for crosschain
transactions, which they then submit to the router chain.
The researchers suggested that the Connectors come to an
agreement on the crosschain transactions, though how this
agreement occurs is not described in the paper. Validator
components mint blocks on the router blockchain using a
PBFT consensus algorithm. Connectors take transactions from
the router chain which are destined for their sub-chain and
submit them to their sub-chain. There is no description of
how the Connector to submit transactions to the sub-chain is
chosen, or what is done to ensure valid transactions are sub-
mitted by the Connector to the sub-chain. The system is kept
secure by fining malicious actors using a complex economic
incentivisation scheme and components called Surveillants.
Kan et. al. [49] proposed a crosschain protocol for heteroge-
neous blockchains via a router blockchain as an intermediary
between chains in a similar way to Cosmos and Polkadot. In
this scheme a three phase commit is proposed. The system
appears to rely on reliable communications to ensure the
system does not result in one chain perceiving a transaction has
succeeded and the other chain perceiving that the transaction
has failed.
Cross-Shard Contract Yanking [50] [51] has been proposed
as a method of crosschain function calls for Ethereum 2.0
shards [52]. In this technique, a special EVM instruction is
used to move a contract and its state temporarily from a shard
to the current shard. The action occurs updating the state. The
updated state is then returned to the originating shard inside
a receipt, possibly with a Merkle proof [53] proving that the
state update was correct. Buterin [50] acknowledges that for
this system to work, the contract needs to have small state
and only be used by one entity. How the system responds
to failures is not well defined. In particular, the case of the
state being updated and the receipt being generated, but not
being committed to the originating shard does not appear to
be handled. From a confidentiality perspective, this approach
is problematic. Users of the contract on the originating shard
could be different to users on the current shard. The users on
the current shard should not be able to see the state of the
yanked contract. The contract may also contain information
which reveals the membership of the originating shard, which
is problematic from a privacy perspective.
A mechanism for cross-Hyperledger Fabric channel com-
munications [54] has been proposed. The methodology is not
documented, may not be secure, and does not appear to be
supported by Hyperledger Fabric.
BTC Relay [55] is a method for allowing users of Ethereum
to confirm Bitcoin transactions. Though not a method of
executing function calls across chains, this technology is in-
teresting as it allows actions to occur on one blockchain based
on another blockchain. Relayers are compensated for posting
Bitcoin block headers to a Smart Contract on Ethereum.
Bitcoin transactions are confirmed by users submitting Merkle
proofs showing that a transaction belonged to a certain block.
BTC Relay relies on PoW mining difficulty for its security.
Multiple active Relay nodes must be prepared to post the block
header for each block. In this way, if one Relay node posts a
block header of a fork of the chain, other Relay nodes can post
the block header of the longest chain. Transactions can only
be validated if the block header they relate to is on the longest
chain and if at least six block headers have been posted on
top of the block header that the transaction relates to [56]. As
attackers can not produce a longer chain than the main Bitcoin
blockchain due to the mining difficulty, they are unable to
confirm transactions based on a malicious fork. PoW is not
an appropriate consensus algorithm for private blockchains as
organisations do not wish to allocate resources to mining of
blocks [12]. Given the reliance of BTC relay on PoW mining
difficulty, it is inappropriate for private blockchains.
The Clearmatics Ion project provides a framework and tools
to develop crosschain smart contracts so that they execute
automatically if a verifiable state transition has occurred on
another database or blockchain [27], [57]. This is known
as ‘continuous execution’. Example code to implement this
functionality is available from the Ion GitHub repository [57],
[58]. The system works by having blocks posted from one
chain to another by a party that asserts a state transition
happened on one chain. The relevant transactions are then
extracted and validated via the relevant Merkle Patricia trie
hashes via contracts on the receiving chain. The initial set up
is via a series of steps deploying contracts on the two systems
to allow the two systems to become known to one another.
D. Blockchain Locking
The Cross-Shard Contract Yanking [50] [51] methodology
described above can be viewed as providing a mechanism for
locking a contract. As described above, this technique is not
appropriate for consortium chains as the confidentiality of the
shard data is not maintained.
Ethereum Researcher Max C [59] describes a two phase
commit locking scheme. The scheme requires locks to be
committed to shards on which data to be atomically updated
resides, and Merkle Proofs proving the state update which
includes the lock be submitted to the shard which will execute
the transaction on the data. This system requires knowledge
of the block hashes of the shards the data resides on, on the
shard which will execute the transaction, to allow the Merkle
Proofs to be verified. Block hashes of one sidechain will
not be available on other sidechains in the proposed system.
Additionally, there is the risk that publishing block hashes of
a sidechain may reveal information about the sidechain, thus
compromising the confidentiality of the other sidechain.
A method for resolving deadlocks in Cross-Shard Locking
has been proposed [60]. This technique requires all cross-
shard transactions to have a start block number. When lock
contention occurs, the cross-shard transaction with the earlier
start block number gains the lock. The methodology does not
handle the case when the two contending transactions have the
same start block number. The idea of using block number as
a proxy for time in contract locking will be used in this paper.
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The Cross-Shard Contract Yanking proposal [50] allows
contracts which include a move_to_shard(uint256
shard_id) function to be yanked between chains. Having
this function is equivalent to indicating that the contract can be
locked, and other contracts which do not contain this function
are nonlockable. The concept of Lockable and Nonlockable
contracts will be used in this paper.
E. Summary
Many of the existing solutions involve a single relay chain
to transfer transactions between chains, which could become
a bottle neck. This will limit the transaction rate of the
crosschain communications technique. Most of the existing
solutions do not protect the privacy of members of the com-
munication blockchains. This means that the techniques are not
appropriate for enterprise blockchain scenarios. Some of the
existing techniques require all blockchains to have the same
consensus algorithm. Allowing different consensus algorithms
on different sidechains is likely to be advantageous. Some of
the techniques require centralised trusted parties to ensure the
operation of the system. Centralisation goes against the ethos
of blockchain. None of the techniques offer atomic crosschain
function calls, and hence do not offer the capabilities of the
proposed Atomic Crosschain Transaction technology.
IV. APPROACH
This section describes the Atomic Crosschain Transaction
protocol. It starts out by describing the protocol components,
then combines the protocol components and presents the over-
all approach. The section concludes with Crosschain Views,
a special case where all calls are Views; that is there are no
transactions.
A. Protocol Components
1) Multichain Nodes: A Multichain Node is a grouping of
one or more sidechain nodes, where each node is on a different
sidechain. The sidechain nodes operate together to allow
Crosschain Transactions and Views. The Multichain Node on
which the transaction is submitted must have Validator Nodes
on all of the sidechains on which the Originating Transaction
and Subordinate Transactions and Views take place, plus have
access to a Coordination Blockchain.
Coordination Blockchains are used to coordinate crosschain
transactions. These blockchains could be Ethereum Private
Sidechains, Ethereum MainNet, or a private blockchain. All
nodes on all sidechains which will participate in a cross-
chain transaction need to be able to access the Coordination
Blockchain.
Consider the example shown in Figure 2. The application
submits a transaction on Sidechain 1. This transaction causes
an Ethereum View call on a contract on Sidechain 2 to execute,
which results in other Ethereum View calls on Sidechain 3
and Sidechain 5. Additionally, as a result of the transaction
on Sidechain 1, an Ethereum Transaction is submitted on
Sidechain 4. This set of Ethereum Transactions and Ethereum
Views is the result of a function call graph, in which a function
Fig. 2. Crosschain Transaction Call Graph
Fig. 3. Enterprises, Multichain Nodes, and Sidechain Nodes
on Sidechain 1 calls functions on Sidechain 2 to fetch a result,
which in turn calls functions on Sidechain 3 and 5 to return
results. The function on Sidechain 1 also calls a function on
Sidechain 4.
Note that the result of submitting an Ethereum Transaction
is to ask a blockchain to come to consensus on the result of
the call. This differentiates blockchain activities from direct
remote procedure calls (RPC) in traditional distributed sys-
tems.
Figure 3 shows a set of enterprises which might take part
in the call graph shown in Figure 2. Enterprise A operates
Multichain Node A which contains validator nodes on each
of the sidechains which make up the call graph. Enterprises
B and C operate Multichain Nodes which do not have nodes
on all of the sidechains. Enterprise B needs to be certain that
the Ethereum Transaction on Sidechain 1 is final, despite not
being able to access Sidechain 4. Enterprise C needs to be
certain of the results returned by View calls on Sidechain 3
and 5. Enterprise C needs to be certain that the Ethereum
Transaction on Sidechain 4 is final despite not being able to
access Sidechain 1.
The sidechain on which the application submits the Orig-
inating Transaction is called the Originating Sidechain. For
example, in Figure 2, it is Sidechain 1. The Originating
Sidechain is transaction specific. It can be a different sidechain
for each Crosschain Transaction.
The sidechain nodes which are part of the Multichain
Node on which the Originating Transaction was submitted
are called Coordinating Nodes. The Coordinating Node for
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each sidechain is responsible for ensuring communications
between sidechains. Each enterprise could submit Crosschain
Transactions to their own Multichain Nodes, thus changing
which nodes are deemed to be Coordinating Nodes each
transaction.
2) Sidechain Keys and Sidechain Threshold Signatures:
Messages from one sidechain can be verified as originating
from the sidechain by use of a threshold signature scheme.
Each validator node on each sidechain has a Sidechain Private
Key Share. Any M of the N sidechain validator nodes must
collaborate to sign a message. The Sidechain Public Key can
be used to verify the signature. The signature and the public
key do not betray any information about which nodes signed,
what the threshold number of validator nodes is (M) , or what
the total number of validator nodes on the sidechain are (N).
Assuming that a sidechain is using a Byzantine Fault
Tolerant consensus protocol that offers finality and can cope
with up to F validators being malicious, off-line, or faulty,
then the threshold M should be set to F+1. This is because
considering that at most F validators are malicious, if F+1
validators agree on a given fact, for example that a transaction
has been finalised, then this implies that at least one of these
validators is honest and it sees the transaction as finalised in
the sidechain. It should be noted that this threshold is less than
the threshold required for consensus algorithms such as IBFT
[16] and IBFT2 [17] which are tolerant of F faulty nodes if
2F+1 nodes are not faulty.
Threshold private key generation occurs when the sidechain
is established. The Sidechain Public Key needs to be pub-
lished to the Coordination Blockchain. Any sidechain node
can access the Sidechain Public Key once it is available
in the Coordination Blockchain. When a validator node is
added or removed from the sidechain, a new key generation
must occur and the new public key must be published to
the Coordination Blockchain. Publishing to the Coordination
Blockchain involves a voting process between participants of
the sidechain. The evaluation of the votes needs to reflect the
threshold M. The voting process should be shielded such that
the membership of the sidechain are not revealed. Salted hash
shielding, similar to what has been used for Anonymous State
Pinning for Private Blockchains [5] [61] should be used.
3) Sidechain Identifier: Sidechain Identifiers are 256 bit
values which identify a sidechain. They are used to identify
which sidechain messages are intended for. They are also
used to tie transactions to specific sidechains, to block replay
attacks on other sidechains. Sidechain identifiers are randomly
generated when the sidechain is first created as per the rules
in Table I. The number range is chosen so as to not clash
with the Chain Id values used in Ethereum so that these
blockchains can be specified using a Sidechain Identifier. A
sidechain keeps the same Sidechain Identifier even if nodes
are added or removed from the sidechain.
4) Crosschain Transaction Identifier & Originating
Sidechain Identifier: The Sidechain Identifier on the
Originating Sidechain is called the Originating Sidechain
Identifier. When an application submits a Crosschain
Transaction to the Coordinating Node on the Originating
Sidechain, it randomly generates a Crosschain Transaction
Identifier. The combination of the Crosschain Transaction
Identifier, the Originating Sidechain Identifier, the
Coordination Blockchain Identifier (see Section IV-A8,
Crosschain Transaction Format), and the Crosschain
Coordination Contract address (see Section IV-A8, Crosschain
Transaction Format) globally identifies messages and
transactions which belong to the Crosschain Transaction.
5) Crosschain Coordination Contract: Crosschain Coor-
dination Contracts exist on Coordination Blockchains. They
allow sidechain nodes to determine whether the state updates
related to the Originating Transaction and Subordinate Trans-
actions should be committed or not. The contract is used to
determine a common time-out for all sidechains.
The contract contains a mapping between the message
digest of the Crosschain Transaction Identifier and the Origi-
nating Sidechain Identifier, and Crosschain Transaction infor-
mation. The information is:
• Transaction Timeout Block Number: This timeout is
based on the Coordination Blockchain block number. If
the Crosschain Transaction Commit message has not been
posted to the Crosschain Coordination Contract prior to
this block number, then the Crosschain Transaction is
deemed to have timed-out. If the transaction times out,
all provisional updates due to the Crosschain Transaction
must be discarded. This value is calculated by the Cross-
chain Coordination Contract when it accepts a Crosschain
Transaction Start message as the current block number
plus the Crosschain Transaction Timeout value contained
in the Crosschain Transaction Start message.
• State Indicator:
– Started: Crosschain Transaction Start message was
received and accepted by the Crosschain Coordina-
tion Contract. No further message has been received.
– Committed: Crosschain Transaction Commit mes-
sage, indicating the Originating Transaction and all
Subordinate Transactions state updates should be
committed, was received and accepted by the Cross-
chain Coordination Contract.
– Ignored: Crosschain Transaction Ignore message, in-
dicating the Originating Transaction and all Subordi-
nate Transactions state updates should be discarded,
was received and accepted by the Crosschain Co-
ordination Contract. This state is used to terminate
Crosschain Transactions prior to the time-out expir-
ing.
The rationale for message digesting the Crosschain Trans-
action Identifier and the Originating Sidechain Identifier is to
tie the Crosschain Transaction Identifier to the Originating
Sidechain, without having to allocate any storage space to
explicitly store the Originating Sidechain Identifier.
A different Coordination Blockchain, and Crosschain Coor-
dination Contract, can be used with each Crosschain Trans-
action. They are specified by the Coordination Blockchain
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Number Range Description
0x00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000 Ethereum MainNet Chain Identifier
to
0x00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,0000FFFF
0x00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,0000FFFF Reserved for future use
to
0xFEFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF
0xFF0000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000 Ethereum Private Sidechains
to
0xFFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF
TABLE I
SIDECHAIN IDENTIFIERS
Fig. 4. Crosschain Transaction States
Identifier and the Crosschain Coordination Contract address
which are included in all Originating Transactions, Subordi-
nate Transactions and Subordinate Views.
6) Crosschain Transaction States: Figure 4 shows how a
Crosschain Transaction transitions between states. The state
is held in the Crosschain Coordination Contract. Most of the
state changes relate to messages described in detail in Section
IV-A12, Crosschain Threshold Messages.
The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain works
with other Originating Sidechain validators to threshold sign
a Crosschain Transaction Start message. This message con-
tains the Crosschain Transaction Identifier, the Originating
Sidechain Identifier, and the Crosschain Transaction Timeout.
Validators will only sign this message if they agree with the
proposed time-out, and are happy to process the proposed
Crosschain Transaction. For example, a validator might choose
to not sign the message if it felt that the Coordinating Node
was spamming the network. The Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain submits the signed message to the
Crosschain Coordination Contract. The Crosschain Coordina-
tion Contract accepts the Crosschain Transaction Start message
if the Originating Sidechain’s Sidechain Public Key can be
used to verify the message. It creates a map entry for the
Crosschain Transaction, sets the Transaction Timeout Block
Number and sets the state to Started.
In due course, the Crosschain Transaction is ready to
be committed. The Coordinating Node on the Originating
Sidechain works with other Originating Sidechain validators
to threshold sign a Crosschain Transaction Commit message.
The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain submits
the signed message to the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
The Crosschain Coordination Contract accepts the Crosschain
Transaction Commit message if the Originating Sidechain’s
Sidechain Public Key can be used to verify the message, and
if the block number on the Coordination Blockchain is less
than or equal to the Transaction Timeout Block Number for
the transaction.
To reduce resource usage, if the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain determines that the Crosschain Transac-
tion is going to fail, it should cancel the transaction. To cancel
the transaction, the Coordinating Node on the Originating
Sidechain works with other Originating Sidechain validators
to threshold sign a Crosschain Transaction Ignore message.
The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain submits
the signed message to the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
The Crosschain Coordination Contract accepts the Crosschain
Transaction Ignore message if the Originating Sidechain’s
Sidechain Public Key can be used to verify the message, and
if the block number on the Coordination Blockchain is less
than or equal to the Transaction Timeout Block Number for
the transaction.
The Crosschain Transaction times-out if neither a Cross-
chain Transaction Commit message or Crosschain Transaction
Ignore message are submitted to the Crosschain Coordination
Contract prior to the block number on the Coordination
Contract being greater than the Transaction Timeout Block
Number. At this point, all state updates related to the Cross-
chain Transaction can be ignored.
Publishing the transaction start, commit or ignore state
along with the time-out to the Coordinating Chain allows all
sidechains to use this chain as a global time-out clock and
global state store. Acting as a global time-out clock, it means
that each chain does not have to rely on its local understanding
of time for time-outs, which would lead to race conditions in
which one sidechain might commit a state update and another
sidechain might ignore a state update. Acting as a global
holder of state ensures sidechains which receive Subordinate
Transactions can be sure that the requested transaction and
associated time-out was approved by all validators on the
Originating Sidechain.
7) Contract Locking and Provisional State Updates: When
a Coordinating Node on a sidechain receives an Originating
Transaction, Subordinate Transaction or View which is part
of a Crosschain Transaction, it checks whether the contract is
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Fig. 5. Contract Locking States
locked. If the contract is locked, then the transaction or view
fails. If the contract isn’t locked, then the transaction or view
can proceed. More complex behaviour is being considered
for future work. However, to avoid complexities such as
deadlocks, a simple fail if locked approach is appropriate for
this initial protocol version.
Figure 5 shows the locking state transitions for a contract.
The Crosschain Coordination Contract will be in Started state.
The act of mining an Originating Transaction or Subordinate
Transaction and including it in a blockchain locks the contract.
The contract is unlocked when the Crosschain Coordination
Contract is in the Committed or Ignored state, or when
the block number on the Coordination Blockchain is greater
than the Transaction Timeout Block Number. The Crosschain
Coordination Contract will change from the Started state to the
Committed state when a valid Crosschain Transaction Commit
message is submitted to it, and it will change from the Started
state to the Ignored state when a valid Crosschain Transaction
Ignore message is submitted to it.
Ordinarily, all nodes will receive a message indicating
that they should check the Crosschain Coordination Contract
when the contract can be unlocked. The message is sent
from the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
to the Coordinating Nodes on all sidechains involved in the
Crosschain Transaction and from there to all nodes on all
sidechains. When a node first processes a transaction, it will
set a local timer which should expire when the Transaction
Timeout Block Number is exceeded. If the node has not
received the message by the time the local timer expires, the
node checks the Crosschain Coordination Contract to see if
the Transaction Timeout Block Number has been exceeded
and whether the updates should be committed or ignored.
When a contract is first deployed it is marked as a Lockable
Contract or a Nonlockable Contract. A Nonlockable Contract
is one which can not be locked. This means that Originating
Transactions or Subordinate Transactions will fail if they call
the contract as the contract can not be locked. To match
existing behaviour, the default when a contract is deployed
is for the contract to be marked as a Nonlockable Contract.
See the Programming Model section, in Section V for an
example of how Nonlockable and Lockable Contracts can be
used together.
8) Crosschain Transaction Format: The Originating Trans-
action, Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views are
all signed. In standard Ethereum, Views execute locally on a
single node. The Subordinate Views in this system executes
on all validators of a sidechain. Having the Subordinate Views
signed should help prevent spamming.
Originating Transactions contain Subordinate Transactions
and Subordinate Views in a tree-like structure, with Subordi-
nate Transactions containing other Subordinate Transactions
and Subordinate Views below them and Subordinate Views
containing other Subordinate Views. The signature of an Orig-
inating Transaction, Subordinate Transaction or Subordinate
View is across all contained Subordinate Transactions or
Subordinate Views. Doing this ensures that nodes processing
Subordinate Transactions and Views can be sure that the nested
Subordinate Transactions and Views have not in some way
being replayed or tampered with.
The Originating Transaction and all Subordinate Transac-
tions and Views contain:
• Type: Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transaction,
or Subordinate View
• Coordination Blockchain Identifier: A Sidechain Identi-
fier which identifies the Coordination Blockchain to use
for this transaction.
• Crosschain Coordination Contract address: The address
of the Crosschain Coordination Contract on the Coordi-
nation Blockchain to use for this transaction.
• Crosschain Transaction Time-out: (Originating Transac-
tion only): The length of time-out measured in Coordi-
nation Blockchain blocks.
• Crosschain Transaction Identifier: Combined with the
Originating Sidechain Identifier, Coordination Blockchain
Identifier, and the Crosschain Coordination Contract ad-
dress gives a globally unique reference to the transaction.
• Originating Sidechain Identifier: Sidechain Identifier of
the Originating Sidechain.
• Sidechain Identifier: (Subordinate Transactions and
Views only) Sidechain Identifier of the sidechain to
execute this Subordinate Transaction or Subordinate View
on.
• Nonce: Standard Ethereum nonce which is unique per
account per sidechain.
• GasPrice: The amount offered to pay for gas for the
transaction.
• GasLimit: The maximum gas which can be used by the
transaction.
• To: Address of the account to send the value to, or the
address of a contract to call.
• Value: The amount of Ether to transfer.
• Data: The RLP encoding of the truncated function signa-
ture hash and the function parameters.
• Array of Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate
Views which are called directly from this Originat-
ing Transaction, Subordinate Transaction or Subordinate
View. Each array element could contain a nested tree of
Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views.
• V: part of the signature.
• R: part of the signature.
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• S: part of the signature.
In EIP 155 [62], when the signature is calculated, the V value is
combined with the Chain Identifier. As the Chain Identifier is
included in the number range of the Sidechain Identifier, there
is not need to combine the V value with the Chain Identifier.
9) Function Call Processing: When a node prepares to
process an Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transaction
or Subordinate View, it creates an ordered list of Subordinate
Transactions and Subordinate Views it expects to execute. It
uses these lists to ensure the code is executing as expected.
The high level code shown in Figure 1 is an abstraction
of how Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views are
called from within a function. Access to Subordinate Trans-
actions and Subordinate Views is provided by precompiled
contracts [8], one for Subordinate Transactions and one for
Subordinate Views. The high level code is preprocessed to
translate it from the high level syntax to precompile calls.
When code is being processed, a call to a function in a
contract on another sidechain results in one of the precompiles
being executed. The precompile is passed the sidechain iden-
tifier of the sidechain the function should be executed on, the
function identifier, and the parameters. The parameter values
passed are the actual values that the EVM has for the variables
at that point. The precompile compares actual values with the
signed values for the next signed Subordinate Transaction or
Subordinate View. The signed values are the values that the
application expected to be passed in. If the actual values do not
match the signed values of the next Subordinate Transaction
or Subordinate View then the function call has failed. At this
point, the entire Crosschain Transaction can be aborted.
10) Crosschain Transaction Generation: A Crosschain
Transaction consists of the Originating Transaction and nested
Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views. Each of
these transactions and views contains signed parameters. These
signed parameter values must match the actual values passed
in via the EVM, as described in the previous section, Function
Call Processing. Further, the Subordinate Transactions and
Views must be put into the Originating Transaction in the
order in which they will execute. A Dynamic Program Anal-
ysis approach is recommended for determining the order of
Subordinate Transactions and Views and the parameter values.
11) Permissioning: Enterprises may wish to restrict which
accounts can execute Subordinate Transactions or Views on
sidechains. This permissioning extends the existing Account
Permissioning of Enterprise Ethereum [12] to include permis-
sioning for Subordinate Views. Allowing enterprises to restrict
which accounts can submit Subordinate Views is appropriate
as they must be executed across all validators on a sidechain,
and hence incur expense for all validators.
12) Crosschain Threshold Messages: The Crosschain
Transaction protocol relies on threshold signed messages
to prove to other sidechains that a sidechain has come to
consensus on some information. The messages are threshold
signed by the validators on the sidechain that wishes to prove
the information. The messages can be verified by using the
Sidechain Public Key available in the Crosschain Coordination
Contract. Table II lists the messages and their contents.
B. Subordinate View Processing
Subordinate Views can be submitted to a sidechain as a
result of the Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transac-
tions, or other Subordinate Views. This section presents how
Subordinate Views should be processed.
In the sequence diagrams below ‘Sidechain B’ is the
sidechain on which the Subordinate View is processed. This
sidechain has been named to differentiate it from the sidechain
submitting the Subordinate View.
The execution of Subordinate Views can be recursive. That
is one Subordinate View can call another.
1) Subordinate View Processing: Coordinating Node: To-
gether figures 6 and 7 show sequence diagrams for the process-
ing a Subordinate View from the perspective of a Coordinating
Node on a sidechain. It should be noted that these simplified
diagrams do not include node failures, and local time-outs for
threshold signing.
Subordinate View Process: Coordinating Node: Part 1,
Figure 6, describes the sequence of events for the Coordi-
nating Node on a Sidechain B to determine whether the core
view processing should be undertaken. Walking through the
sequence diagram:
1) The Coordinating Node on a sidechain submits a Sub-
ordinate View for processing to the Coordinating Node
on Sidechain B.
2) The node checks whether the account has permission to
execute a Subordinate View on this sidechain.
3) An error is returned if the account which signed the
Subordinate View is not allowed to execute views on
this sidechain.
4) The Coordination Blockchain and Crosschain Coordina-
tion Contract address specified in the Subordinate View
are checked to see if they are trusted.
5) Return an error if the Coordination Blockchain or the
Crosschain Coordination Contract are not trusted by this
sidechain.
6) The Coordinating Node on Sidechain B checks that
the Crosschain Transaction has been started, has not
been committed or ignored, and has not timed-out.
While doing this call, the node also fetches Sidechain
Public Keys for each Subordinate View called by this
Subordinate View’s function call from the Crosschain
Coordination Contract.
7) An error is returned if the Crosschain Transaction is not
still active.
8) An error is returned if all of the Sidechain Public Keys
for the sidechains which Subordinate Views are to be
submitted to are not available.
Subordinate View Process: Coordinating Node: Part 2,
Figure 7, describes the sequence of events for the Coordinating
Node on Sidechain B to execute the core view processing.
Walking through the sequence diagram:
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Fig. 6. Subordinate View Processing: Coordinating Node Perspective: Part 1
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Fig. 7. Subordinate View Processing: Coordinating Node Perspective: Part 2
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Message Description Contents
Crosschain Transaction Start Submitted by the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain to the Originating Sidechain Identifier
Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate the start of a Crosschain Crosschain Transaction Identifier
Transaction. Coordination Blockchain Identifier
Crosschain Coordination Contract address
Crosschain Transaction Time-out
measured in Coordination
Blockchain number of blocks.
Crosschain Transaction Commit Submitted by the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain to the Originating Sidechain Identifier
Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate that the transaction should Crosschain Transaction Identifier
be committed. Coordination Blockchain Identifier
Crosschain Coordination Contract address
Crosschain Transaction Ignore Submitted by the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain to the Originating Sidechain Identifier
Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate that the transaction should Crosschain Transaction Identifier
be ignored. Coordination Blockchain Identifier
Crosschain Coordination Contract address
Subordinate Transaction Ready Sent by the Coordinating Node on the sidechain on which the Subordinate Originating Sidechain Identifier
Transaction executed to the Coordinating Node on the Originating Crosschain Transaction Identifier
Sidechain to indicate the Subordinate Transaction has been mined, the Coordination Blockchain Identifier
transaction is final, and the updates are ready to be committed. Crosschain Coordination Contract address
Sidechain Identifier of the sidechain
that the Subordinate Transaction
executed on.
Transaction Hash
Subordinate View Result Sent by the Coordinating Node on a sidechain which has executed a Originating Sidechain Identifier
Subordinate View to the Coordinating Node on the sidechain which Crosschain Transaction Identifier
called the Subordinate View to convey the result of the view. Coordination Blockchain Identifier
Crosschain Coordination Contract address
Sidechain Identifier of the sidechain
that the Subordinate View
executed on.
Block number when the Subordinate
View executed.
Subordinate View Hash
Result
TABLE II
CROSSCHAIN THRESHOLD MESSAGES
1) The Coordinating Node on Sidechain B submits any
Subordinate Views called as a result of the Subordinate
View function call being processed to the Coordinating
Nodes on the sidechains which the Subordinate Views
need to execute.
2) On each sidechain, the Subordinate Views are processed
recursively according to the Subordinate View Process-
ing Rules described in this section.
3) An error is returned if any of the Subordinate Views
dispatched from this sidechain to other sidechains return
an error.
4) Errors from called Subordinate Views are propagated
back to the calling sidechain.
5) Assuming no errors are returned by any of the other
sidechains and the time-out did not expire, then a
Subordinate View Result message will be returned for
each Subordinate View submitted to other sidechains.
6) The signature of each Subordinate View Result mes-
sage is checked using the Sidechain Public Key of the
sidechain the Subordinate View was executed on. An
error is returned if the signature on one or more of the
Subordinate View Result messages returned from other
sidechains fails to verify.
7) The Subordinate View function call to be processed on
Sidechain B is executed. When a Subordinate View is
called from within the function call, the actual sidechain,
contract address and parameter values are compared
against the signed values which are the next Subordinate
View to be dispatched. The function execution aborts if
the values do not match. If they do match, then the return
value specified in the Subordinate View Result message
is returned to the function.
8) An error is returned if there is an execution error. In
addition to the standard Ethereum EVM errors which
standard Ethereum contracts can encounter, it is an error
if the actual parameters and the signed parameters of
a Subordinate View called from the Subordinate View
function call being processed do not match.
9) Work with all of the validator nodes on the sidechain to
threshold sign a Subordinate View Result message.
10) An error is returned if not enough nodes indicate they
are prepared to sign the Subordinate View Result mes-
sage. In this case, the nodes would have returned error
messages indicating they would not sign. Additionally,
the nodes may time-out.
11) Send the Subordinate View Result message to the Co-
ordinating Node which submitted the Subordinate View
for processing.
2) Subordinate View Processing: Other Nodes: Figure 8,
shows the sequence diagram for the first half of the processing
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of a Subordinate View from the perspective of a validator node
which is not a Coordinating Node on a sidechain. Walking
through the sequence diagram:
1) The Coordinating Node on the sidechain sends a Sub-
ordinate View Result message to be signed to the node.
The request includes the Subordinate View which is
being processed along with the signed Subordinate View
Result messages for all other sidechains which are called
as part of the Subordinate View function call.
2) The node checks whether the account has permission to
execute a Subordinate View on this sidechain.
3) An error is returned if the account which signed the
Subordinate View is not allowed to execute views on
this sidechain.
4) The Coordination Blockchain and Crosschain Coordina-
tion Contract address specified in the Subordinate View
are checked to see if they are trusted.
5) Return an error if the Coordination Blockchain or the
Crosschain Coordination Contract are not trusted by this
sidechain.
6) The node checks that the Crosschain Transaction has
been started, has not been committed or ignored, and
has not timed-out. During the same call, the node fetches
Sidechain Public Keys for each Subordinate View called
by this Subordinate View’s function call from the Cross-
chain Coordination Contract.
7) An error is returned if the Crosschain Transaction is not
still active.
8) An error is returned if all of the Sidechain Public Keys
for the sidechains for all Subordinate Views called by
the function are not available.
9) The node checks the block number specified in the
Subordinate View Result message is valid. That is, that
the block number is not in the future and is not too old.
Subordinate View Processing: Nodes Other than the Coordi-
nating Node Perspective: Part 2, Figure 9, shows the sequence
diagram for the second half of the processing of a Subordinate
View from the perspective of a Validator Node which is not
a Coordinating Node on a sidechain. Walking through the
sequence diagram:
1) The signature of each Subordinate View Result mes-
sage is checked using the Sidechain Public Key of the
sidechain the Subordinate View was executed on.
2) An error is returned if one or more of the signatures
does not verify.
3) The Subordinate View function call to be processed on
Sidechain B is executed. When a Subordinate View is
called from within the function call, the actual sidechain,
contract address and parameter values are compared
against the signed values which are the next Subordinate
View to be dispatched. The function execution aborts if
the values do not match. If they do match, then the return
value specified in the Subordinate View Result message
is returned to the function.
4) An error is returned if there is an execution error. In
addition to the standard Ethereum EVM errors which
standard Ethereum contracts can encounter, it is an error
if the actual parameters and the signed parameters of
a Subordinate View called from the Subordinate View
function call being processed do not match.
5) Check that the result shown in the request to sign the
Subordinate View Result message matches the result of
the Subordinate View function call execution.
6) Return an error if the actual result does not match what
the Coordinating Node is requesting be signed.
7) Threshold sign the Subordinate View Result message.
8) Return the partially signed message to the Coordinating
Node.
C. Subordinate Transaction Processing
Subordinate Transactions can be submitted to a sidechain
as a result of the Originating Transaction or other Subordinate
Transactions. This section presents how Subordinate Transac-
tions should be processed.
1) Subordinate Transaction Processing: Coordinating
Node: Together Figures 10 and 11 show sequence diagrams
for the processing a Subordinate Transaction from the
perspective of a Coordinating Node on a sidechain. It should
be noted that these simplified diagrams do not account for
node failures, requests to abort the Crosschain Transaction
part way through the sequence, and do not include local
time-outs set whilst waiting for the threshold signing process.
Subordinate Transaction Processing: Coordinating Node
Perspective: Part 1, Figure 10, shows the sequence diagram
for the first half of the processing of a Subordinate Transaction
from the perspective of a Coordinating Node on a sidechain.
Walking through the sequence diagram:
1) The Coordinating Node on a sidechain submits a Sub-
ordinate Transaction for processing to the Coordinating
Node on Sidechain B.
2) The Coordinating Node on Sidechain B checks whether
the account which signed the transaction has permission
to execute transactions on this sidechain.
3) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain if the account which signed this
Subordinate Transaction is not allowed to submit trans-
actions to this sidechain.
4) The Coordination Blockchain and Crosschain Coordi-
nation Contract specified in the Subordinate Transaction
are checked to see if they are trusted.
5) Return an error to the Coordinating Node on the Origi-
nating Sidechain if the Coordination Blockchain or the
Crosschain Coordination Contract are not trusted by this
sidechain.
6) The Coordinating Node on Sidechain B checks that the
Crosschain Transaction has been started, has not been
committed or ignored, and has not timed-out. The node
also fetches Sidechain Public Keys for each Subordinate
View called by this Subordinate View’s function call
from the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
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Fig. 8. Subordinate View Processing: Nodes Other than the Coordinate Node Perspective: Part 1
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Fig. 9. Subordinate View Processing: Nodes Other than the Coordinate Node Perspective: Part 2
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7) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain if the Crosschain Transaction is
not still active.
8) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain if all of the Sidechain Public Keys
for the sidechains which Subordinate Views are to be
called as a result of the Subordinate Transaction function
call are not available.
Subordinate Transaction Processing: Coordinating Node
Perspective: Part 2, Figure 11, shows the sequence diagram for
the second half of the processing of a Subordinate Transaction
from the perspective of a Coordinating Node on a sidechain.
Walking through the sequence diagram:
1) The Coordinating Node on Sidechain B submits any
Subordinate Views called as a result of the Subordinate
Transaction function call it is processing to the Coordi-
nating Nodes on the sidechains which the Subordinate
Views need to execute.
2) On each sidechain, the Subordinate Views are processed
recursively according to the Subordinate View Process-
ing Rules described in Section IV-B.
3) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain if any of the Subordinate Views
returns an error.
4) The Coordination Nodes on the sidechains which have
executed the Subordinate Views returns a threshold
signed Subordinate View Result message.
5) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain if a Subordinate View Result
message for each dispatched Subordinate View is not
returned. The transaction fails if the signatures on all of
the Subordinate Views can not be verified.
6) Execute the function call in the Subordinate Transaction.
When a Subordinate View or Subordinate Transaction is
called from within the function call, the actual sidechain,
contract address and parameter values are compared
against the signed values which are the next Subordinate
Transaction or View to be dispatched. The function
execution aborts if the values do not match. If they
do match, then for the Subordinate Views, the return
value specified in the Subordinate View Result message
is returned to the function.
7) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain if the function fails to execute to
completion.
8) Distribute the Subordinate Transaction and Subordinate
View Result messages to all validators and have the
transaction mined according to the sidechain’s consensus
algorithm. The contract is locked when the transaction
is included in the blockchain.
9) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain if the validators reject the trans-
action.
10) The Coordinating Node works with all of the validator
nodes on the sidechain to threshold sign a Subordinate
Transaction Ready message.
11) An error is returned if not enough nodes indicate they
are prepared to sign the Subordinate Transaction Ready
message. The nodes will respond with error messages
indicating why they do not want to sign.
12) Any Subordinate Transactions called from the the Orig-
inating Transaction are dispatched to the appropriate
sidechain.
13) On each sidechain, Subordinate Transactions are pro-
cessed recursively according to the Subordinate Trans-
action Processing rules described in Section IV-C.
14) The Subordinate Transaction Ready message is sent
from the Coordinating Node on Sidechain B to the
Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain.
15) Once the Crosschain Transaction Commit message has
been verified and accepted by the Crosschain Coordi-
nation Contract, the Crosschain Transaction is ready to
be committed on all sidechains. The Coordinating Node
on the Originating Sidechain sends a message request-
ing that all nodes check the Crosschain Coordination
Contract.
16) The Coordinating Node on Sidechain B trusts the Co-
ordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain because
they are a part of the same Multichain Node. As such,
it forwards the message requesting that all nodes check
the Crosschain Coordination Contract immediately.
17) The Coordinating Node on Sidechain B checks the
Crosschain Coordination Contract to see if the Cross-
chain Transaction was committed or ignored. The Coor-
dinating Node applies the state updates if the transaction
was committed. If the state is Committed or Ignored
the node unlocks the contract.
2) Subordinate Transaction Processing: Other Nodes:
Together Figures 12 and 13 show sequence diagrams for the
processing a Subordinate Transaction from the perspective of
a node which is not the Coordinating Node on a sidechain. It
should be noted that these simplified diagrams do not account
for node failures.
Subordinate Transaction Processing: Other Node Perspec-
tive: Part 1, Figure 12, shows the sequence diagram for first
half of the processing of a Subordinate Transaction from the
perspective of a node other than the Coordinating Node on a
sidechain. Walking through the sequence diagram:
1) The Coordinating Node on Sidechain B sends a Subordi-
nate Transaction to be mined, along with the associated
Subordinate View Result messages to all validator nodes
on Sidechain B.
2) Each validator node checks whether the account which
signed the transaction has permission to execute trans-
actions on this sidechain.
3) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node if the
account which signed this Subordinate Transaction is
not allowed to submit transactions to this sidechain.
4) The Coordination Blockchain and Crosschain Coordi-
nation Contract specified in the Subordinate Transaction
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are checked to see if they are trusted.
5) Return an error to the Coordinating Node if the
Crosschain Coordination Contract or the Coordination
Blockchain are not trusted by this sidechain.
6) Each validator node checks that the Crosschain Transac-
tion has been started, has not been committed or ignored,
and has not timed-out. The node fetches Sidechain
Public Keys for each Subordinate View called by this
Subordinate Transaction’s function call from the Cross-
chain Coordination Contract.
7) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node if the
Crosschain Transaction is not still active.
8) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node if all
of the Sidechain Public Keys for the sidechains which
Subordinate Views are to be called as a result of the
Subordinate Transaction function call are not available.
9) Each validator node checks that the Transaction Timeout
Block Number, the global time-out, is an acceptable
value. That is, it checks that the block number is equal
to or less than the amount of time it is prepared to have
a contract locked for.
10) The validator returns an error if it finds the Transaction
Timeout Block Number to be unacceptable.
Subordinate Transaction Processing: Other Node Perspec-
tive: Part 2, Figure 13, shows the sequence diagram for the
second half of the processing of a Subordinate Transaction
from the perspective of a node other than the Coordinating
Node on a sidechain. Walking through the sequence diagram:
1) Each validator node checks the signature of each Sub-
ordinate View Result message.
2) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node if any of
the signatures can not be verified.
3) Execute the function call in the Subordinate Transaction.
When a Subordinate View or Subordinate Transaction is
called from within the function call, the actual sidechain,
contract address and parameter values are compared
against the signed values which are the next Subordinate
Transaction or View to be dispatched. The function
execution aborts if the values do not match. If they
do match, then for the Subordinate Views, the return
value specified in the Subordinate View Result message
is returned to the function.
4) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node if the
function fails to execute to completion.
5) The consensus algorithm specific mining algorithm com-
pletes.
6) The Coordinating Node sends the Subordinate Trans-
action Ready message to be signed. The message con-
tains the Originating Sidechain Identifier, the Crosschain
Transaction Identifier, the Coordination Blockchain
Identifier, the Crosschain Coordination Contract address,
the Sidechain Identifier of the sidechain that the Subor-
dinate Transaction has to be executed on and the hash
of the Subordinate Transaction. Each validator threshold
signs the message and returns it to the Coordinating
Node if a transaction which matches the message has
been finalised.
7) Once the Crosschain Transaction Commit message has
been verified and accepted by the Crosschain Coordina-
tion Contract, the Crosschain Transaction is ready to be
committed on all sidechains. The Coordinating Node on
the Originating Sidechain sends a message requesting
that all nodes check the Crosschain Coordination Con-
tract. This message is forwarded from the Coordinating
Node on Sidechain B to all validators on the sidechain.
8) Each validator checks the Crosschain Coordination Con-
tract to see if the Crosschain Transaction was committed
or ignored. The Coordinating Node applies the state
updates if the transaction was committed. If the state
is Committed or Ignored the node unlocks the
contract.
D. Crosschain (Originating) Transaction Processing
Applications submit Originating Transactions to sidechains.
The sidechains are designated Originating Sidechains for the
purpose of the Crosschain Transaction. The processing of the
Originating Transaction, and all Subordinate Transactions and
Views within the Originating Transaction constitutes process-
ing of the entire Crosschain Transaction. This section presents
how Originating Transactions should be processed.
1) Crosschain (Originating) Transaction Processing: Coor-
dinating Node: Together Figures 14, 15 and 16 show sequence
diagrams for the processing an Originating Transaction from
the perspective of a Coordinating Node on the Originating
Sidechain. It should be noted that these simplified diagrams do
not account for node failures, requests to abort the Crosschain
Transaction part way through the sequence, and do not include
local time-outs set whilst waiting for the threshold signing
process. In the diagrams, while the transaction is active, any
action which results in Crosschain Transaction failed could
then trigger the creation of a Crosschain Transaction Ignore
message between the nodes on the Originating Sidechain and
submission of that message to the Crosschain Coordination
Contract.
Originating Transaction Process: Coordinating Node: Part
1, Figure 14, describes the sequence of events for the Coordi-
nating Node on the Originating Sidechain to determine if the
Crosschain Transaction should be started. Walking through the
sequence diagram:
1) The application submits the Originating Transaction to
the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain.
2) The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
checks whether the account which signed the transaction
has permission to execute transactions on this sidechain.
3) The transaction fails if the account which signed this
Originating Transaction is not allowed to submit trans-
actions to this sidechain.
4) The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
checks that the sidechain or blockchain specified by the
Coordination Blockchain Identifier in the Originating
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Transaction is available in Multichain Node and trusted
to be a Coordination Blockchain. The Crosschain Co-
ordination Contract address is checked to ensure it is
trusted.
5) The transaction fails if the Coordination Blockchain
is not available or not trusted or if the Crosschain
Coordination Contract is not trusted.
6) The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
checks that the Multichain Node on which it is running
contains validator nodes on all of the sidechains repre-
sented by the Subordinate View and Subordinate Trans-
action in the entire Subordinate View and Transaction
tree. The Multichain Node does this to ensure the entire
Crosschain Transaction will be able to execute.
7) The transaction fails if some of the required sidechains
are not available in the Multichain Node.
8) The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
fetches Sidechain Public Keys for each Subordinate
View and Subordinate Transaction in the entire Subor-
dinate View and Transaction tree. This is done to ensure
all public keys are available.
9) The transaction fails if some of Sidechain Public Keys
are not available.
Originating Transaction Process: Coordinating Node: Part
2, Figure 15, describes the sequence of events in which
the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain starts
and then later commits the Crosschain Transaction. Walking
through the sequence diagram:
1) The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
works with other validators on the Originating Sidechain
to threshold sign the Crosschain Transaction Start mes-
sage.
2) The Crosschain Transaction fails if fewer than the
threshold number of nodes sign the Crosschain Trans-
action Start message prior to a local time-out expiring.
3) The Crosschain Transaction Start message is submitted
to the Crosschain Coordination Contract. The message
contains the Originating Sidechain Identifier, Crosschain
Transaction Identifier and the Crosschain Transaction
Timeout. Assuming the message is accepted, an entry
for the Crosschain Transaction is created. The message
is rejected if the combination of Crosschain Transaction
Identifier and Originating Sidechain already exist, or
if the threshold signature can not be verified by the
Sidechain Public Key, or if the Crosschain Transaction
Timeout is greater than the largest time-out the contract
is configured to allow.
4) The Crosschain Transaction fails if the Crosschain Co-
ordination Contract rejects the Crosschain Transaction
Start message.
5) The core transaction processing then occurs. See Figure
16. At the end of this process the Originating Transac-
tion and all Subordinate Transactions are ready to be
committed.
6) The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
works with other validators on the Originating Sidechain
to threshold sign the Crosschain Transaction Commit
message.
7) The Crosschain Transaction fails if fewer than the
threshold number of nodes sign the Crosschain Transac-
tion Commit message prior to a local time-out expiring.
8) The Crosschain Transaction Commit message is submit-
ted to the Crosschain Coordination Contract. Assuming
the message is accepted, the entry for the Crosschain
Transaction is updated to indicate it is committed. The
message is rejected if the combination of Crosschain
Transaction Identifier and Originating Sidechain do not
exist, or if the threshold signature can not be verified by
the Sidechain Public Key, if the transaction has already
been marked as Committed or Ignored, or if the
block number is greater than the Transaction Timeout
Block Number.
9) The Crosschain Transaction fails if the Crosschain Co-
ordination Contract rejects the Crosschain Transaction
Commit message.
10) The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
requests other nodes on the Originating Sidechain check
the Crosschain Coordination Contract to see that the
transaction has been committed.
11) The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
requests that Coordinating Nodes on other sidechain
check the Crosschain Coordination Contract to see that
the transaction has been committed.
Originating Transaction Process: Coordinating Node: Part
3, Figure 16, describes the sequence of events in which the
Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain requests the
results of Subordinate Views, executes the Originating Trans-
action function call, and submits any Subordinate Transactions
which result from the function call. Walking through the
sequence diagram:
1) The Coordination Node on the Originating Sidechain
dispatches all of the Subordinate Views which are
listed in the Subordinate Transaction and View hierarchy
immediately below the Originating Transaction to the
sidechains they should be executed on.
2) Each sidechain processes the Subordinate View accord-
ing to the Subordinate View Processing rules described
in Section IV-B.
3) The Crosschain Transaction Fails if any of the Subordi-
nate Views returns an error.
4) The Coordination Nodes on the sidechains which have
executed the Subordinate Views returns a threshold
signed Subordinate View Result message.
5) The Crosschain Transaction Fails if a Subordinate View
Result message for each dispatched Subordinate View is
not returned. The transaction fails if the signatures on
all of the Subordinate Views can not be verified.
6) Execute the function call in the Originating Transaction.
When a Subordinate View or Subordinate Transaction is
called from within the function call, the actual sidechain,
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contract address and parameter values are compared
against the signed values which are the next Subordinate
Transaction or View to be dispatched. The function
execution aborts if the values do not match. If they
do match, then for the Subordinate Views, the return
value specified in the Subordinate View Result message
is returned to the function.
7) The transaction fails if the function fails to execute to
completion.
8) Distribute the Originating Transaction and Subordinate
View Result messages to all validators and have the
transaction mined according to the sidechain’s consensus
algorithm.
9) The Crosschain Transaction fails if the validators reject
the transaction.
10) Any Subordinate Transactions called from the the Orig-
inating Transaction are dispatched to the appropriate
sidechain.
11) On each sidechain, Subordinate Transactions are pro-
cessed recursively according to the Subordinate Trans-
action Processing rules described in Section IV-C.
12) The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
waits a Subordinate Transaction Ready messages is
received for each of the dispatched Subordinate Trans-
actions.
13) The Crosschain Transaction fails if not all of the Sub-
ordinate Transaction Ready messages are received prior
to a local time-out, or if the signature on any of the
messages fails.
2) Crosschain (Originating) Transaction Processing: Other
Nodes: Together Figures 17 and 18 show sequence diagrams
for the processing an Originating Transaction from the per-
spective of a node which is not the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain. It should be noted that these simplified
diagrams do not account for node failures.
Originating Transaction Processing: Other Node Perspec-
tive: Part 1, Figure 17, shows the sequence diagram for first
half of the processing of an Originating Transaction from the
perspective of a node other than the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain. Walking through the sequence diagram:
1) The Coordinating Node sends a request to threshold
sign the Crosschain Transaction Start message and the
Originating Transaction to all validator nodes on the
Originating Sidechain.
2) Each validator node checks whether the account which
signed the transaction has permission to execute trans-
actions on this sidechain.
3) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node if the
account which signed this Originating Transaction is not
allowed to submit transactions to this sidechain.
4) The Coordination Blockchain and Crosschain Coordi-
nation Contract specified in the Originating Transaction
are checked to see if they are trusted.
5) Return an error to the Coordinating Node if the
Crosschain Coordination Contract or the Coordination
Blockchain are not trusted by this sidechain.
6) Each validator node checks that the Crosschain Trans-
action Time-out proposed in the Crosschain Transaction
Start message, the global time-out, is an acceptable
value. That is, it checks that the number of blocks is
equal to or less than the amount of time it is prepared
to have a contract locked for.
7) The validator returns an error if it finds the Crosschain
Transaction Timeout to be unacceptable.
8) Each validator fetches Sidechain Public Keys for all
Subordinate Views and Subordinate Transactions in the
call graph starting from the Originating Transaction from
the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
9) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node if all of
the Sidechain Public Keys are not available.
10) Threshold sign the Crosschain Transaction Start mes-
sage.
11) Return the partially signed Crosschain Transaction Start
message to the Coordinating Node.
Originating Transaction Processing: Other Node Perspec-
tive: Part 2, Figure 18, shows the sequence diagram for the
second half of the processing of an Originating Transaction
from the perspective of a node other than the Coordinating
Node on the Originating Sidechain. Walking through the
sequence diagram:
1) The Coordinating Node sends the Originating Transac-
tion to be mined, along with the associated Subordinate
View Result messages to all validator nodes on the
Originating Sidechain.
2) Each validator node checks the signature of each Sub-
ordinate View Result message.
3) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node if any of
the signatures can not be verified.
4) Execute the function call in the Originating Transaction.
When a Subordinate View or Subordinate Transaction is
called from within the function call, the actual sidechain,
contract address and parameter values are compared
against the signed values which are the next Subordinate
Transaction or View to be dispatched. The function
execution aborts if the values do not match. If they
do match, then for the Subordinate Views, the return
value specified in the Subordinate View Result message
is returned to the function.
5) An error is returned to the Coordinating Node if the
function fails to execute to completion.
6) The consensus algorithm specific mining algorithm com-
pletes.
7) Once all Subordinate Transactions have returned Sub-
ordinate Transaction Ready messages to the Coordinat-
ing Node on the Originating Blockchain, it sends the
Crosschain Transaction Commit message to be signed.
The Subordinate Transaction Ready messages for all
Subordinate Transactions are attached to the request.
8) The signatures on each Subordinate Transaction Ready
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message is checked. An error is returned if any of the
signatures fail to verify.
9) The validator threshold signs the Crosschain Transaction
Commit message.
10) The partially signed Crosschain Transaction Commit
message is returned to the Coordinating Node.
11) Once the Crosschain Transaction Commit message has
been verified and accepted by the Crosschain Coordi-
nation Contract, the Crosschain Transaction is ready to
be committed on all sidechains. The Coordinating Node
on the Originating Sidechain sends a message request-
ing that all nodes check the Crosschain Coordination
Contract.
12) Each validator checks the Crosschain Coordination Con-
tract to see if the Crosschain Transaction was committed
or ignored. The Coordinating Node applies the state
updates if the transaction was committed. If the state
is Committed or Ignored the node unlocks the
contract.
E. Crosschain View Processing
Crosschain Views are view calls which call across
sidechains within a Multichain Node. Whereas Crosschain
Transactions have at their top level an Originating Transaction,
Crosschain Views have at their top level a view call. As the
view calls only read state, no interaction with other nodes on
any of the sidechains is required. As the value of results of
each view call on each sidechain does not need to be proven
to validators other than the Coordinating Node, the results do
not need to be signed. As there are no updates, no contracts
need to be locked. The Crosschain View Processing can occur
synchronously.
As Crosschain View calls do not update state based on
values read from the distributed ledger, there is flexibility with
how locked contracts are treated. The Crosschain View calls
can:
• Fail if any contract called is locked.
• If any contract is locked, process the call assuming the
lock fails.
• If any contract is locked, process the call assuming the
lock succeeds.
V. PROGRAMMING MODEL
This section provides some guidelines and considerations
when designing applications which initiate Atomic Crosschain
Transactions.
A. Transactions and Views
In the existing Ethereum programming model [63],
Ethereum Transactions are asynchronous [64] [65] [66]. They
are executed some time after submission and execution may or
may not occur. Additionally, Ethereum Transactions can not
return a value. However, a transaction hash is returned to allow
the status of the transaction to be tracked. The programming
model required to support Crosschain Transactions is similarly
asynchronous.
Ethereum Views currently execute synchronously. They
execute immediately on the Ethereum node the request is sub-
mitted to on a local copy of the distributed ledger. Crosschain
Views will similarly execute synchronously on the Multichain
Node the request is submitted to on local copies of the
distributed ledgers.
B. Designing Contracts for Locking
When a Crosschain Transaction fails because it is trying to
lock a contract which is already locked, the contract is said to
be in lock contention. To minimise lock contention, contracts
should be designed to handle only small amounts of data. This
is in contrast with the current trend to have large monolithic
contracts which manage a lot of data. An example is shown in
the Section V-D, Atomic Swap Ether Transfer Example, which
explains this in detail.
C. Call Depth
This technology allows for arbitrarily deep call depths
between sidechains. That is, there is no hard limit to the
nesting of Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views
below an Originating Transaction. The deeper the call depth
due of a Crosschain Transaction, the more likely a call is
to encounter a contract which is locked and fail. We are
actively researching guidelines for call depth (see Section
X, Future Work). While we are developing these guidelines,
we suggest a call depth of two or three. That is, limiting
Crosschain Transactions to an Originating Transaction calling
a Subordinate Transaction or View, which calls a Subordinate
Transaction or View.
D. Atomic Swap Ether Transfer Example
Imagine contracts which facilitate atomic swaps of Ether
between Sidechains A and B. On each sidechain there is
an Atomic Swap Registration Contract. These contracts are
Nonlockable Contracts. When an entity wishes to offer Ether
on Sidechain A for Ether on Sidechain B, it deploys a
new Atomic Swap Execution Contract on each sidechain.
These contracts would be Lockable Contracts. The execution
contracts indicate how much Ether the entity has available
on Sidechain A and what exchange rate it is prepared to
offer. The entity registers each of the execution contracts
with the registration contracts on each sidechain. A second
entity wishing to offer Ether on Sidechain B for Ether on
Sidechain A could monitor the Atomic Swap Registration
Contracts, executing repeated Crosschain View calls. The
Crosschain View calls could check for matching Atomic Swap
Execution Contracts which are deployed on each sidechain,
which offer Ether on sidechain A at an acceptable exchange
rate. The Crosschain View call could return the address of
the Atomic Swap Execution Contract on Sidechain A. The
second entity could then execute a Crosschain Transaction to
affect the swap, executing the transaction against the Atomic
Swap Execution Contract on Sidechain A. The Atomic Swap
Execution Contract on Sidechain A would call the Atomic
Swap Execution Contract on Sidechain B.
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An important characteristic of the atomic swap technique
described in the previous paragraph is that the second entity
does not need to swap for all of the value which the first
entity is offering. In previous techniques [28] the amount being
swapped had to be the entire amount. Requiring the entire
amount be swapped is a major limitation as this requires the
exchanging entities to agree on the amount to be swapped out
of band prior to executing the atomic swap on the blockchain.
No entity can lock the contract thus blocking the registration
of new atomic swaps because the Atomic Swap Registration
Contract is an Nonlockable Contract. As the Atomic Swap
Execution Contract is a Lockable Contract, entities can be sure
that swaps will occur atomically. They can be sure that only
one entity is able execute an atomic swap on the Atomic Swap
Execution Contract at a time. However, many Atomic Swap
Execution Contracts can be registered with the Atomic Swap
Registration Contract, thus allowing a multitude of atomic
swaps to occur simultaneously.
VI. FAILURE CASES HANDLED WITHIN PROTOCOL
This section describes how failures such as nodes going
off-line or network connections breaking are handled by
the protocol. In particular, all failures and potential failures
described in this section are handled automatically by the
protocol, and do not require application intervention.
A. Multichain Node not on all Sidechains
Situation: Multichain Nodes must have validator nodes on
all sidechains which are called in the Crosschain Transaction.
When the Originating Transaction is submitted to the Coor-
dinating Node on the Originating Sidechain, the Coordinating
Node has to assess whether it has all of the sidechains available
given the Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views to
be processed.
Issue: If a Coordinating Node does not think that the
Multichain Node has access to all of the sidechains necessary
to complete the Crosschain Transaction, then it should abort
the Crosschain Transaction as soon as possible, to prevent
resource wastage.
Action: Coordinating Nodes return an error to the caller if
the tree of Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views
contains a transaction or view which needs to be submitted to
a sidechain which is not part of the Multichain Node.
B. Common Signer for Subordinate Views and Transactions
Situation: When a Coordination Node receives a tree of
Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views, they may
not all be signed by the same account.
Issue: Allowing Subordinate Transactions or Subordinate
Views which were signed by accounts other than the one
submitting the top level Transaction or signed View could
possibly be used as some form of replay attack.
Action: An error is returned to the application.
C. Crosschain Transaction Replay
Situation: An attacker may have a copy of an old Crosschain
Transaction. The transaction may have failed to be committed.
The attacker should not be able to replay the transaction.
Issue: If a Crosschain Transaction could be replayed, at-
tackers could attempt to attack the system with the replayed
transaction.
Action: The transaction will be rejected by the Crosschain
Coordination Contract when the Coordination Node on the
Originating Sidechain submits the Crosschain Transaction
Start message because an entry will already exist for the
combination of Originating Sidechain Identifier and Cross-
chain Transaction Identifier on the Coordination Blockchain
specified in the transaction.
D. Coordinating Node on the Originating Blockchain Failures
Situation 1: The Coordinating Node on the Originating
Blockchain fails before the Crosschain Transaction Start mes-
sage has been accepted by the Crosschain Coordination Con-
tract.
Issue 1: The Crosschain Transaction will not start.
Action 1: The Crosschain Transaction will not be commit-
ted.
Situation 2: The Coordinating Node on the Originating
Blockchain fails at any point before the Crosschain Trans-
action Commit message has been accepted by the Crosschain
Coordination Contract.
Issue 2: The Crosschain Transaction will time-out, and then
be ignored.
Action 2: The Crosschain Transaction will not be commit-
ted.
Situation 3: The Coordinating Node on the Originating
Blockchain fails after the Crosschain Transaction Commit
message has been accepted by the Crosschain Coordination
Contract, but before it has sent out the request for all nodes
to look at the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
Issue 3: Nodes will not know that the Crosschain Transac-
tion has been committed.
Action 3: All of the nodes will have set-up a local timer
which should expire when the Transaction Timeout Block
Number is exceeded. Alternatively, they could wait until they
need to access the contract state. Either way, they check the
Crosschain Coordination Contract to see if the Crosschain
Transaction should be committed or ignored.
E. Coordinating Node on a Sidechain Executing a Subordi-
nate View or Transaction Fails
Situation 1: The Coordinating Node on a sidechain exe-
cuting a Subordinate Transaction or View fails before the
Subordinate Transaction or View has been submitted to the
sidechain.
Issue 1: The Coordinating Node will not be available to
process the Subordinate Transaction or View.
Action 1: The Coordinating Node on the sidechain which
submitted the Subordinate Transaction or View will not be
able to contact the Coordinating Node. If it is processing a
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Subordinate View, it will propagate an error to its caller. If it
is processing a Subordinate Transaction, it will propagate an
error to the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain.
The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain will
work with other nodes on the Originating Sidechain to sign
a Crosschain Transaction Ignore message, and will submit
it to the Crosschain Coordination Contract. The Crosschain
Transaction will be ignored.
Situation 2: The Coordinating Node on a sidechain exe-
cuting a Subordinate View fails after the Subordinate View
has been submitted but prior to the Subordinate View Result
message being returned.
Issue 2: The Coordinating Node which submitted the Sub-
ordinate View will not get the result of the Subordinate View.
Action 2: The Coordinating Node on the sidechain which
submitted the Subordinate View will time-out waiting for the
result. It will propagate an error to its caller in the case
of a Subordinate View or to the Coordinating Node on the
Originating Sidechain in the case of a Subordinate Transaction.
The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain will
work with other nodes on the Originating Sidechain to sign
a Crosschain Transaction Ignore message, and will submit
it to the Crosschain Coordination Contract. The Crosschain
Transaction will be ignored.
Situation 3: The Coordinating Node on a sidechain exe-
cuting a Subordinate Transaction fails after the Subordinate
Transaction has been submitted and mined, and the Subor-
dinate Transaction Ready message has been threshold signed,
but prior to the Subordinate Transaction Ready message being
sent to the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain.
Issue 3: The Coordinating Node on the Originating
Sidechain will not receive a Subordinate Transaction Ready
message for the Subordinate Transaction. However, the nodes
on the sidechain have mined the Subordinate Transaction.
Action 3: The Coordinating Node on the Originating
Sidechain will time-out waiting for the Subordinate Trans-
action Ready message. It will work with other nodes on
the Originating Sidechain to sign a Crosschain Transaction
Ignore message, and will submit it to the Crosschain Co-
ordination Contract. The nodes on the sidechain with the
failed Coordination Node will have set-up a timer which
should expire when the Transaction Timeout Block Number
is exceeded. Alternatively, they could wait until they need to
access the contract state. Either way, they check the Crosschain
Coordination Contract to see if the Crosschain Transaction
should be committed or ignored. The Crosschain Transaction
will be ignored.
Situation 4: The Coordinating Node on a sidechain execut-
ing a Subordinate Transaction or View fails before it receives
the request to check the Crosschain Coordination Contract for
the commit state.
Issue 4: Nodes on the sidechain will not know that the
Crosschain Transaction has been committed.
Action 4: All of the nodes on the sidechain will have set-
up a timer which should expire when the Transaction Timeout
Block Number is exceeded. Alternatively, they could wait until
they need to access the contract state. Either way, they check
the Crosschain Coordination Contract to see if the Crosschain
Transaction should be committed or ignored.
F. General Node Failures
Situation: A node which isn’t a Coordinating Node fails.
Issue: If enough nodes fail, the sidechain will not be able
to threshold sign messages.
Action: If any of the threshold signed messages can not be
signed, the transaction will fail. If the Crosschain Transaction
Ignore message can not be created, then the transaction will
time-out. The Crosschain Transaction will be ignored.
G. Nodes Removed from a Sidechain
Situation: Nodes can be removed from sidechain due to
voting or other sidechain specific mechanisms. If this occurs,
then the node will no longer have permission to connect to
other nodes on the sidechain.
Issues and Actions: This is an equivalent situation to a node
failing. See Sections VI-D, VI-E, and VI-F for details.
H. Network Connection Failures
Situation: Network connections between nodes could fail.
This is less likely to occur between nodes in a Multichain
Node than for nodes in a sidechain, as nodes in a Multichain
Node are likely to be co-located and nodes in a sidechain are
likely to be widely dispersed.
Issues and Actions: Network failure scenarios will be sim-
ilar to a node failing. See Sections VI-D, VI-E, and VI-F for
details.
I. Attacker Compromises Nodes
Situation: An attacker could fully compromise a node. They
could execute arbitrary code on the node.
Issue 1: The attacker could try to create Crosschain Trans-
action Start messages with long time-outs, hoping to lock
contracts for long periods. They could try to create Subordinate
View Result messages with incorrect results. They could try
to create Crosschain Transaction Commit messages to attempt
to commit failed Crosschain Transactions.
Action 1: Nodes will not threshold sign messages which
they do not agree with. The resulting action will be for the
Crosschain Transaction to fail.
Issue 2: If the attacker was a Coordinating Node they could
hold a Subordinate Transaction. If the application resubmits
the transaction (see Section VII-B, Resubmitting Failed Cross-
chain Transactions) prior to the original transaction timing-
out, the attacker could release the Subordinate Transaction
and have it mined ahead of the resubmitted Subordinate
Transaction. The resubmitted Subordinate Transaction would
fail as it would use a nonce value which matched the nonce
value used by the released transaction. This could result in a
scenario similar to Section VI-O, Livelock.
Action 2: The application should wait for the original
Crosschain Transaction to time-out prior to submitting new
transactions. The attacker behaviour could be detected. The
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compromised node could be removed from the sidechain while
the owner of the Multichain Node containing the compromised
node removed the attacker.
J. Threshold Signing Issues
Situation: Coordinating Nodes create messages which need
to be threshold signed in various parts of the protocol.
Not enough of the validators may cooperate to create the
threshold signature. This could happen for several reasons
including: some validators do not believe the message should
be signed, some validators being offline or some validators
are uncontactable. Validators will send error message to the
Coordinating Node if they do not want to sign the message.
The Coordinating Node sets a local timer to detect time-out
conditions whilst waiting for partial signatures. Independent
of the reason, the Coordinating Node will be left not able to
complete the threshold signing of the message.
Issue: The issue depends on the message which can not be
signed:
• Crosschain Transaction Start: The Coordinating Node on
the Originating Sidechain can not start the Crosschain
Transaction by submitting the Crosschain Transaction
Start message to the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
• Crosschain Transaction Commit: The Coordinating Node
on the Originating Sidechain can not commit the Cross-
chain Transaction by submitting the Crosschain Trans-
action Commit message to the Crosschain Coordination
Contract.
• Crosschain Transaction Ignore: The Coordinating Node
on the Originating Sidechain can not request the Cross-
chain Transaction be ignored early, thus unlocking locked
contracts early, by submitting the Crosschain Transaction
Ignore message to the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
• Subordinate Transaction Ready: The Coordination Node
on a sidechain can not indicate to the Coordinating
Node on the Originating Sidechain that the Subordinate
Transaction has been mined and is ready to be committed.
• Subordinate View Result: The Coordination Node on a
sidechain can not return a Subordinate View result to the
Coordinating Node which instigated the call.
Action: The action depends on the message which can not
be signed:
• Crosschain Transaction Start: The Coordinating Node
on the Originating Sidechain terminates the Crosschain
Transaction.
• Crosschain Transaction Commit: The Crosschain Trans-
action will time-out when the block number on the
Coordination Blockchain is greater than the Transaction
Timeout Block Number.
• Crosschain Transaction Ignore: The Crosschain Trans-
action will time-out when the block number on the
Coordination Blockchain is greater than the Transaction
Timeout Block Number.
• Subordinate Transaction Ready: The Coordination Node
on the sidechain will indicate to the Coordinating Node
on the Originating Sidechain an error indicating that
the Subordinate Transaction Ready message can not
be created. The Coordinating Node on the Originating
Sidechain will attempt to create a Crosschain Transaction
Ignore message to terminate the transaction early.
• Subordinate View Result: An error message is returned to
the calling Coordinating Node. The error is propagated up
to the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain.
The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain
will attempt to create a Crosschain Transaction Ignore
message to terminate the transaction early.
K. Coordination Blockchain Congestion
Situation: The Coordinating Node on the Originating
Sidechain submits an Ethereum Transaction to start, commit
or ignore the Crosschain Transaction to the Crosschain Coor-
dination Contract on the Coordination Blockchain. If there is
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the blockchain nodes, or
if the blockchain utilisation is very high, the transaction may
not be accepted.
Issue: The issues are the same as is described in Section
VI-J, Threshold Signing Issues.
Action: The actions are the same as is described in Section
VI-J, Threshold Signing Issues.
L. Sidechain Public Key Issues
Situation: Threshold signed messages are generated by
validator nodes on sidechains to prove values to entities not
on the sidechain. The messages are verified using Sidechain
Public Keys which can be obtained from the Coordination
Blockchain. The signature on a message could fail to verify
when a validator was added or removed from the sidechain,
during the transition time when the public key was updated
on the Coordination Blockchain.
Issue: Crosschain Transactions will fail if threshold signa-
tures can not be verified.
Action: The validator nodes should continue to use old
threshold private keys until the new public key is available on
the Coordination Blockchain. The old public key should be
available and able to be used for a short period after the new
public key is published, to allow threshold messages which
have been signed but not verified to be verified.
M. Adding Nodes to a Sidechain
Situation: When a new sidechain node joins the network, it
will attempt to synchronise the blockchain.
Issue 1: Based solely on the blockchain data, the new node
will not know which Originating and Subordinate Transactions
should be committed and which should be ignored.
Action 1: For each Originating and Subordinate Transac-
tion, the node needs to check with the appropriate Coordina-
tion Blockchain and Crosschain Coordination Contract to see
if the transaction was committed or not.
Issue 2: The new node may not be able to reach the
appropriate Coordination Blockchains, which could stop its
ability to synchronise the blockchain.
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Action 2: There is no mitigation for this situation. It may be
wise to periodically (or on another basis) create a new genesis
block which integrates the current state of the distributed
ledger for long-lived sidechains to limit the potential impact.
This would be similar to W3C’s Checkpoint Block [67].
N. Crosschain Transaction with Existing Contracts
Situation: An existing blockchain system may receive an
upgrade which enables Crosschain Transactions.
Issue: Contracts on the existing blockchain may not have
been written to cater for Crosschain Transactions. In particular,
the locking caused by a Crosschain Transaction may adversely
affect the system.
Action: Contracts which have not been created with a
Lockable flag can not be locked. As such, all contracts
on the existing system would not be lockable. Attempting to
perform a Crosschain Transaction involving these contracts
would fail as the transaction would fail when it attempted to
gain a lock on the contract.
O. Livelock
Situation: Suppose that the contracts in Listings 1 and 2
are deployed on Sidechains 1 and 2 respectively. They each
execute two Crosschain Transactions, one calling a function in
a contract on Sidechain 3 first and then a function in a contract
on Sidechain 4, and the other in the opposite order.
1 contract Contract1 {
2 function foo() {
3 sc3.c31.buy()
4 sc4.c41.sell()
5 }
6 }
Listing 1. Livelock Failure Case: Sidechain 1
1 contract Contract2 {
2 function bar() {
3 sc4.c41.sell()
4 sc3.c31.buy()
5 }
6 }
Listing 2. Livelock Failure Case: Sidechain 2
The following sequence of events may occur:
• Application A submits a Crosschain Transaction to Mul-
tichain Node A for Contract1.foo() on Sidechain
1.
• Application B submits a Crosschain Transaction to Mul-
tichain Node B for Contract2.bar() on Sidechain
2.
• The Crosschain Transaction Start messages for the
Crosschain Transactions are signed and accepted by a
Crosschain Coordination Contract for Sidechain 1 and
Sidechain 2.
• Multichain Node A gets Sidechain 3 to mine the Sub-
ordinate Transaction which is calling c31.buy(), that
locks contract c31.
• Multichain Node B gets Sidechain 4 to mine the Subor-
dinate Transaction which is calling c41.sell(), that
locks contract c41.
• The Crosschain Transaction initiated by Application A
now fails when executing sc4.c41.sell() because
contract c41 is locked.
• The Crosschain Transaction initiated by Application B
now fails when executing sc3.c31.buy() because
contract c31 is locked.
• Both transaction fails.
• Both applications are notified of the failed transactions.
• Both applications will submit the respective transactions
again.
• This situation could happen in perpetuity.
Issue: The sequence of events outlined above leads to a
livelock situation where neither the transaction c1.foo() nor
the transaction c2.bar() will ever be committed.
Action: There is no solution for the moment. However,
it should be noted that the probability that none of the
transactions will be committed decreases as time progresses.
P. Centralisation
Situation: It could be considered that this proposed approach
is centralised due to the existence of concepts such as Origi-
nating Blockchain and Coordination Nodes.
Issue: Centralisation is against the ethos of blockchain.
Action: The Crosschain Transaction system has per trans-
action centralisation. That is, there are single Coordinating
Nodes per sidechain, and in particular there is a single Coordi-
nating Node on the Originating Sidechain. If these nodes or the
connections between them fail, the crosschain transaction fails.
Despite these per transaction centralisation points, the overall
system is decentralised. Any Multichain Node can instigate a
crosschain transaction from any sidechain.
VII. FAILURE CASES HANDLED BY APPLICATION
This section explains how application design can help
prevent failures such as a contract being continually locked. In
particular, all failures and potential failures described in this
section need to be handled by the application, because they
are not automatically handled by the protocol.
A. Heavily Used Contracts Continually Being Locked
Situation: Contracts used by many entities could be contin-
ually locked.
Issue: Entities wishing to read data from the contract could
not read data. The contract could become unusable.
Action: Follow the guidelines in Section V, Programming
Model.
B. Resubmitting Failed Crosschain Transactions
Situation: Crosschain Transactions may fail for a variety of
reasons. The Crosschain Transaction needs to be resubmitted.
Issue: None, some or all of the Originating Transaction and
Subordinate Transactions may have been mined. Ethereum
Transactions require the next Ethereum Transaction Nonce
must be used. Ethereum Clients reject transactions submitted
with out of order nonces.
Action: A new Crosschain Transaction must be created as
the Crosschain Transaction Identifier must be unique. Prior to
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creating the new Crosschain Transaction, the application must
determine what nonce values should be used for the Originat-
ing Transaction and Subordinate Transactions, given some of
the Originating Transaction and Subordinate Transactions may
have been mined in the failed Crosschain Transaction.
C. Scaling within a Sidechain
Situation: The threshold signature scheme used by this
approach requires 2N messages to be passed between nodes on
a sidechain for each threshold signed message. A Crosschain
Transaction requires two threshold signed messages (Start and
Commit or Ignore) plus one threshold signed message for each
Subordinate Transaction and for each Subordinate View.
Issue: Ethereum Private Sidechains using the consensus
algorithms in the IBFT family (e.g. Clique, IBFT, IBFT 2) will
encounter practical limitations in the number of validators due
to the amount of message traffic generated by the protocols.
Additionally, sidechains using IBFT may also encounter se-
curity vulnerabilities when operating on partially synchronous
networks [68].
Action: Limit the number of nodes in a sidechain which is
likely to be part of Crosschain Transactions. The research team
plan to determine quantifiable limits as described in Section
X, Future Work.
D. Coordination Blockchain Bottleneck
Situation: All Crosschain Transactions require two
Ethereum Transactions to be submitted to the Coordination
Blockchain; one to start the transaction and one to commit
or ignore the transaction. If many sidechains use the one
Coordination Blockchain, then it could become overwhelmed,
and start and commit messages may not be able to be
submitted when needed.
Issue: If a Coordinating Node on an Originating Sidechain
can not successfully submit a Crosschain Transaction Start
message then the Crosschain Transaction can not be started
and will fail. If the Crosschain Transaction Commit message
can not be successfully submitted, then a transaction which
could have been committed will time-out and be ignored.
Action: A multitude of Coordination Blockchains could be
used. These blockchains could in fact be Ethereum Private
Sidechains. Different Coordination Blockchains could be used
with each Crosschain Transaction. However, all nodes which
will be involved in the transaction need to be able to access
the Coordination Blockchain.
E. Coordination Blockchain Availability
Situation: When a new node joins a sidechain, it needs to
access all Coordination Blockchains referenced in Originating
and Subordinate Transactions to determine if the transactions
in the blockchain should be committed or ignored.
Issue: This implies that Coordination Blockchains need
to live for as long as the oldest sidechain which they are
referenced in.
Action: Prior to archiving any Coordination Blockchain,
audit all operational sidechains to ensure no transaction refers
to the Coordination Blockchain. An alternative to this is
from time to time create an authenticated snapshot of the
blockchain state, which new nodes can use as a starting point
for synchronising the blockchain. This would be similar to
W3C’s Checkpoint Block [67].
F. Privacy of Transactions in Crosschain Coordination Con-
tract
Situation: The Coordinating Node on the Originating
Sidechain submits an Ethereum Transactions to start, com-
mit and ignore Crosschain Transactions. These transactions
include the Originating Sidechain Identifier. These transactions
must be signed by an Ethereum Account on the Coordination
Blockchain.
Issue: The rate of Crosschain Transactions originating from
a particular sidechain for a particular enterprise is revealed
on the Coordination Contract. The Ethereum Account on the
Coordination Blockchain might be able to be linked to a
specific enterprise. If this could be done, then the fact that
a specific enterprise is a member of the sidechain would be
revealed.
Action: There is no mitigation for this situation.
G. Adding and Removing Nodes from a Sidechain
Situation: The Crosschain Transaction System described in
this paper relies on threshold signatures for proving values
across sidechains, and threshold voting for updating Sidechain
Public Keys in the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
Issue: Adding a validating node to a sidechain and not
adjusting the threshold will make it easier for validators to
collude to produce malicious threshold signed messages or
change the Sidechain Public Key. Removing a validating node
from a sidechain and not adjusting the threshold will make it
harder and could make it impossible to sign messages.
Action: As validating nodes are added and removed from
a sidechain, the threshold used for distributed key generation
and for voting on Sidechain Public Keys needs to be adjusted.
The threshold could be set to match the threshold of the
consensus algorithm. In this way, if a block can be produced
on a sidechain, then so too will a threshold signed message
be able to be produced.
H. Trust Boundaries
Situation: On a single blockchain, the trust boundary is
defined around the entire chain including all of its nodes, but
excluding applications such as wallets that might connect to
it. The trust boundary for a single chain is guaranteed by the
nature of the chain itself and is therefore both implemented
and maintained at a technical level. Crosschain transactions
introduce an expansion of the trust boundary that must extend
a priori to all other sidechains and coordination blockchains
that are utilised by the Originating Sidechain.
Issue: The crosschain trust boundary cannot be defined
statically because it may be extended at runtime by authors of
smart contracts. The trust boundary also cannot be enforced
technically. Therefore, crosschain trust boundaries must be
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both defined and managed socially, at a level above the
sidechain itself.
Action: Originating Sidechain operators must choose to trust
operators and implementations of all other sidechains and
Coordination Blockchains that are utilised by the Originating
Transaction, or restrict smart contracts from being able to
access them via out of band mechanisms; for example white or
black network connection lists or firewall rules. Setting only
selected smart contracts as Lockable will act to reduce the
Trust Boundary.
I. Byzantine Coordination Blockchains
Situation: Byzantine Coordination Blockchains could nega-
tively impact state on Originating Sidechains by selectively
answering checks from other validator nodes on whether
Crosschain Transactions have been committed.
Issue: Such behaviour could result in forking validators on
Originating Sidechains, and could conceivably place them in
states from which they cannot recover the correct state of their
blockchain.
Action: The actions are the same as is described in Section
VII-H, Trust Boundaries.
J. Liveness Issue 1
Situation: The overall combined minimum network latency
is greater than the time-out specified by the Transaction
Timeout Block Number.
Issue: The Crosschain Transaction cannot be executed as
the transaction will always time-out. The block number on
the Coordination Blockchain will always be greater than
the Transaction Timeout Block Number before a Crosschain
Transaction Commit message can be submitted to the Coordi-
nation Blockchain.
Action: The Application should submit a new Crosschain
Transaction with a longer timeout. Note that the guidelines in
Section VII-B, Resubmitting Failed Crosschain Transactions
should be taken into consideration prior to submitting the new
transaction.
K. Liveness Issue 2
Situation: The minimum network latency is higher than
the largest Crosschain Transaction Time-out the Crosschain
Coordination Contract is configured to allow.
Issue: The Crosschain Transaction cannot be executed as
the transaction will always time-out. The block number on
the Coordination Blockchain will always be greater than
the Transaction Timeout Block Number before a Crosschain
Transaction Commit message can be submitted to the Coordi-
nation Blockchain.
Action: Use a Crosschain Coordination Contract which is
configured to allow larger Crosschain Transaction Time-outs.
L. DoS using Subordinate Reads
Situation: Imagine there were three sidechains A, B, and
C, that Enterprise A has a Multichain Node on all three
sidechains, and Enterprise B has a Multichain Node on
sidechains B and C. Further imagine that there is a time
sensitive bidding process on sidechain C which Enterprise A
and B are competing on. To lodge a bid, Enterprise A must do
a Crosschain Transaction involving sidechains A and C, and
Enterprise B must do a Crosschain Transaction involving B
and C. Enterprise A might be able to execute many legitimate
Crosschain Transactions which execute Subordinate Views on
sidechain B.
Issue: Enterprise A might be able to overload the computing
resources for sidechain B, thus blocking Enterprise B’s ability
to submit a bid.
Action: The actions are the same as is described in Section
VII-H, Trust Boundaries.
VIII. APPLYING TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER BLOCKCHAINS
A. Private Blockchains
The atomic crosschain transaction technology described in
this paper could be applied to a wide variety of private
blockchain and distributed ledger systems including Hyper-
ledger Fabric [69] [70], Corda [71] and Quorum [13] [72] [73].
To operate as a sidechain within a Multichain Node, using
an Ethereum blockchain for the Coordination Blockchain, the
platforms would need to offer the following features:
• Validators: A set of validators which can attests to the
state of the blockchain.
• Threshold signature scheme and associated dis-
tributed key generation and messaging: This is re-
quired so that the blockchain can generate crosschain
messages such as the Subordinate View Result message.
• Finality: The consensus algorithm used on the blockchain
must be able to determine when a block is final. This is
required because crosschain messages such as the Cross-
chain Transaction Ready and the Crosschain Transaction
Commit messages can not be issued until the Subordinate
and Originating Transactions they relate to are final.
• Contract locking and unlocking mechanisms: This is
required so that transactions across blockchains will be
atomic.
• Subordinate View / Transaction Execution: A platform
specific method for indicating a Subordinate Transaction
or View should be executed within the contract code. In
Ethereum platforms this takes the form of a precompile.
• RLP encoded function calls: The encoding format for
crosschain transactions is RLP encoding. As such, func-
tion call parameter values need to be translated to and
from the native blockchain format to RLP encoded values.
• JSON RPC cc_SendRawCrosschainTransaction
API method: This is the API called by other blockchains
to execute Subordinate Views and Subordinate
Transactions.
B. Public Blockchains
The underlying assumption of the crosschain transaction
technology is that all participants are known and wish to
maintain their reputation. It is assumed that the consequences
for acting inappropriately occur outside of the blockchain.
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Having this assumption allows a set of validators to threshold
sign a message which attests to the state of the blockchain. If a
permissionless blockchain system could meet this assumption,
then they too could support this technology.
IX. CONCLUSION
We introduced a methodology for Atomic Crosschain Trans-
actions across private sidechains and blockchains. Using the
techniques described in this paper, a function in a contract
on one sidechain could call functions in contracts on other
sidechains. This capability allows functionality or data avail-
able in one sidechain to be used by other sidechains, which
opens up a swathe of new opportunities within the blockchain
ecosystem. The onus rests on the application designers and
developers to adhere to the programming model and guidelines
to fully harness this powerful technology, and in the spirit
of the open source community contribute to extending this
functionality to make it even more robust and flexible.
This technology has been described in terms of Ethereum
Private Sidechains. However, it could be used with any con-
tract based private blockchain system which incorporates the
requisite features. In particular, the ideas in this paper could
facilitate an inter-ledger protocol which would allow disparate
blockchain technologies to interoperate.
X. FUTURE WORK
The following areas are being actively pursued as part of
the Crosschain Transactions work.
• Theoretical and practical performance analysis. In partic-
ular, to determine the performance of Crosschain Trans-
actions as the number of nodes in a sidechain grows and
the Subordinate Transaction and View depth grows.
• Investigate more complex locking mechanisms and the
potential to invoke different types, or levels, of locking
depending on the call graph and complexity of the
Crosschain Transactions.
• Statistical analysis of the probability of transaction failure
due to locking errors based on the call depth of Subor-
dinate Transactions and Views.
• Charging Gas and mining Ethereum Views to provide an
economic cost of calling Ethereum Views.
• Determine the feasibility and rationale for charging Gas
for Subordinate Transactions even if the Crosschain
Transaction fails.
• Formal analysis of the protocol.
• Crypto economic incentivisation analysis.
• Programming templates and schemes.
• Evaluation of the feasibility of crosschain operations
when one of the subordinate chains uses a consensus
algorithm with probabilistic finality.
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